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PATENT ELIGIBILITY OF DISEASE DIAGNOSIS 
Shahrokh Falati, Ph.D., J.D.* 
The U.S. Supreme Court effectively redefined the scope of patent 
eligible subject matter when it decided Mayo.1 This decision focused 
on medical diagnostic technology and has had a profound effect on 
the biotechnology and personalized medicine industries in the 
United States. Subsequent back-to-back decisions by the Supreme 
Court in Myriad2 and Alice3 have made it unequivocally clear that 
there is now wholesale broadening of the judicially created 
exceptions to statutory laws governing patent eligible subject 
matter. This has caused havoc in the biopharmaceutical industry by 
not only making it a near impossibility to obtain a patent in certain 
fields, but also by vastly increasing the number of medical 
diagnostic patents being invalidated based on Section 101 of Title 
35 of the U.S. Code. This major change in law has had unintended 
consequences, discouraging research and development necessary 
for new medical diagnostic and therapeutic methods to come to 
market. This article analyzes the patent eligibility legal landscape 
and focuses on emerging medical diagnostic technologies to explain 
why the Supreme Court’s recent rulings were made in error. I end 
by discussing how Congress could either abolish, as unnecessary, 
the non-statutory, Supreme Court-created, exceptions to 
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 1 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
 2 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013). 
 3 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
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Section 101, or to amend the statute. Only by doing so can our laws 
once again encourage and reward creative thinkers and 
entrepreneurs who take risk and innovate new medical diagnostic 
technologies in the U.S. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Patents drive technological innovation in our society. The 
mechanism by which they do this is to reward those who make a 
novel contribution in their field with a monopoly that can bring the 
patent owner a financial benefit. At the same time, patent law 
encourages inventors to ultimately disclose their inventions to the 
public, so that the public at large benefits from technological 
innovation and progress. 
In the United States, for any technology or invention to be 
patentable, it must first be deemed to be a subject matter that is 
“patent eligible.”4 If it is not a patent eligible subject matter, it will 
be impossible to obtain protection for that technology under U.S. 
patent law. Yet, even if it is subject matter that is deemed to be 
“patent eligible,” the technology must then also be found by the U.S. 
 
 4 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (outlining the requirements for patentability). 
66 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 21: 63 
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to be (1) useful, (2) novel, 
and (3) nonobvious before a patent can be issued.5 
An invention is eligible for a patent under Section 101 only if it 
is a process or method, machine or apparatus, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, and only if it falls outside of three judicially 
created exceptions to patentability. These judicially created 
exceptions to the subject matter expressly stated in the statute 
include laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.6 
Natural phenomena embody anything that could be discovered in 
nature;7 natural laws include correlations and laws determining how 
the natural world works;8 and abstract ideas can be anything from 
mathematical formulas to fundamental economic practices.9 
The Supreme Court had decades ago decided that Congress 
intended patent eligible subject matter, under Section 101, to 
“include anything under the sun that is made by man.”10 Yet, in three 
recent back-to-back Supreme Court decisions,11 the Court has 
effectively redefined the scope of patent eligible subject matter by 
greatly expanding the scope of the judicially-created exceptions to 
the statutory patent eligibility laws, thereby significantly narrowing 
the scope of subject matter that is patent eligible. Moreover, with 
this recent change, there are now two lines of Supreme Court cases 
 
 5 See Novelty and Non-obviousness, Conditions for Obtaining a Patent, USPTO 
(Oct. 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-
concerning-patents#heading-5 [https://perma.cc/A2KW-9E48]. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Myriad, 569 U.S. 576 (contrasting the discovery of natural phenomena with 
invention). 
 8 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012) 
(deciding that the relation between certain blood metabolites and the likelihood a 
drug, thiopurine, being “ineffective or cause harm” was “a consequence of the 
ways in which thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body” and therefore 
an ineligible natural law). 
 9 Robert Sachs, The Alice Guidance Categories of Potential Abstract Ideas, 
BILSKI BLOG (Sept. 9, 2014), https://www.bilskiblog.com/2014/09/day-3-
example-categories-of-potential-abstract-ideas/ [https://perma.cc/RSY2-7L8E]. 
 10 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that a bacterium that 
had been genetically modified to effectively digest oil can be patented). 
 11 Mayo, 566 U.S. 66; Myriad, 569 U.S. 576; Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank 
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
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that are inconsistent and contradict each other.12 The effect of this 
uncertainty has been profound, devastating the biotechnology, 
personalized medicine, and medical diagnostics industries in the 
United States. 
The field of personalized medicine is fast evolving and now 
allows for tailored therapeutic strategies for both treatment and 
prevention purposes based on an individual’s unique genomic and 
proteomic profile.13 This is a rapidly growing field of technology 
that is proving to be transformational for medical interventions. The 
success of personalized medicine hinges on new and innovative 
medical diagnostic technologies. These medical diagnostic 
technologies are generally used in clinical medicine to identify the 
patient’s condition and therefore provide for early and effective 
treatment of the particular disease at hand. Being able to accurately 
diagnose a disease with low chance of a missed diagnosis, an error 
in diagnosis, or a delayed diagnosis are all crucial features in the 
management of a disease, and all are dependent on newly emerging 
medical diagnostic technologies. 
Unsurprisingly to many patent law practitioners with a 
biomedical background, the Supreme Court’s recent Mayo decision 
resulted in a dramatic increase in patent offices rejecting 
applications related to personalized medicine and medical 
diagnostics fields. Indeed, according to one study, while prior to the 
Mayo decision only 15.9 percent of personalized medicine-related 
patent applications had rejections based on a lack of subject matter 
eligibility, this grew staggeringly to 86.4 percent post-Mayo.14 In 
 
 12 See discussion of Mayo in view of Diehr, infra Sections III.b and IV.b; see 
also John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A Need for 
Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1765, 1776 (2014). Historically, I would point out that there are four primary 
Supreme Court cases that showcase two separate approaches to patent eligibility. 
Current law is, in large part, an extension of Funk Bros. and Flook decisions, 
however, existing contrary approaches to patent eligibility by Supreme Court 
include the Chakrabarty and Diehr decisions. 
 13 See discussion infra Part IV.a. 
 14 Bernard Chao & Amy Mapes, An Early Look at Mayo’s Impact on 
Personalized Medicine, 2016 PATENTLY-O PATENT L.J. 10 (2016). It should be 
noted that this study did not include any analysis of the ultimate outcome of these 
rejections in order to see if any rejections are withdrawn in view of attorney 
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another recent article,15 the authors point out that the new patent 
eligibility legal framework resulted in no less than 830 patent 
applications being abandoned at the USPTO within the first six 
weeks of the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo.16 Courts have used 
this new test to invalidate patent claims at a rate no less than 83 
percent during that same period.17 Two years after the Supreme 
Court changed the law in Alice, the numbers were largely similar, 
with the Federal Circuit using Alice to reject patent claims at a rate 
of more than 90 percent in both 2015 and 2016.18 
By 2019, the Federal Circuit invalidated more than three 
quarters of cases it has heard on patent eligibility in those five years 
since the recent Supreme Court rulings.19 Professor Osenga has 
nicely summarized by positing that “[t]he doctrine of patent-eligible 
subject matter is a mess, and it is weakening patent rights in this 
country. Nearly everyone, from the bar to the bench and from 
academia to industry, has called for reform.”20 Indeed, other scholars 
 
arguments, something that would be important in assessing the ultimate practical 
effects of the Supreme Court’s recent patent-eligibility decisions. 
 15 Jasper L. Tran & J. Sean Benevento, Alice at Five, 2019 PATENTLY-O 
PATENT L.J. 25 (2019). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Jasper L. Tran, Software Patents: A One-Year Review of Alice v. CLS Bank, 
97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 532, 545 (2015); see also, Tristan Gray-Le 
Coz & Charles Duan, Apply It to the USPTO: Review of the Implementation of 
Alice v. CLS Bank in Patent Examination, 2014 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 1, 3 
(2014). 
 18 Id. (showing that the Federal Circuit used Alice as a basis to reject 94.1 
percent of patent claims in 2015 and 92.3 percent of patent claims in 2016). 
 19 Robert R. Sachs et al., Benevolent Despot or Tyrant? Alice v CLS Bank Five 
Years on, IAM (May 23, 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/benevolent-despot-
or-tyrant-alice-v-cls-bank-five-years [https://perma.cc/8LP4-CHYE]. The data 
covers software and biotechnology/life science patents but excludes Alice 
challenges for covered business method (CBM) review. For a brief summary of 
post-Alice cases, see Overview of Section 101 Patent Cases Decided After Alice 
v. CLS (as of March 1, 2019), GIBSON, DUNN, & CRUTCHER, 
https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Overview-of-
Section-101-Patent-Cases-Decided-After-Alice-v-CLS-as-of-03-01-19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BQ9Y-GCF6] (last visited Mar. 27, 2020). 
 20 Kristen Osenga, Institutional Design for Innovation: A Radical Proposal for 
Addressing § 101 Patent-Eligible Subject Matter, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1191, 1191 
(2019). 
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have described the new Supreme Court test as one that “forces lower 
courts to engage in mental gymnastics,”21 is “a foggy standard 
cloaked as a rule,”22 a “crisis of confusion”23 and others have seen 
the new patent eligibility law as so aggressive that “the penumbra 
around pure abstract ideas and natural phenomena is growing 
larger.”24 Moreover, many judges on the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit have openly expressed their frustration with this new 
patent eligibility standard.25 
The current legal framework has had particularly harmful 
consequences in the medical diagnostics industry. Existing 
biomedical patents are being struck down as invalid at the earliest 
pleading stages of litigations. The USPTO, confused on how to 
apply this new standard, has issued no less than five separate 
examination guidelines on how to apply the standard in as many 
years,26 making it all but impossible to obtain any meaningful patent 
 
 21 Annal D. Vyas, Alice in Wonderland v. CLS Bank: The Supreme Court’s 
Fantastic Adventure into Section 101 Abstract Idea Jurisprudence, 9 AKRON 
INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 2 (2015). See also Brief of 19 Law Professors as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnosis, 
Inc. et al. (2016) [hereinafter Sequenom Amicus Brief]. 
 22 Michael Risch, Nothing Is Patentable, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 45 (2015). 
 23 David O. Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2149, 
2164 (2017). 
 24 Risch, supra note 22. 
 25 See discussion infra Part IV. Former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), Judge Michel, predicted that the new 
Supreme Court for patent eligibility would “create total chaos,” stating that it is 
“too vague, too subjective, too unpredictable and impossible to administer in a 
coherent, consistent way in the patent office or in the district courts or even in the 
federal circuit.” See Gene Quinn, Judge Michel Says Alice Decision ‘will create 
total chaos,’ IPWATCHDOG.COM (Aug. 2, 2014), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/ 
2014/08/06/judge-michel-says-alice-decision-will-create-total-chaos/id=50696/ 
[https://perma.cc/57UC-GMPE]. Chief Judge of the CAFC, Judge Rader, referred 
to the CAFC’s inability to render a majority opinion in Alice as the greatest failure 
of his career. In his view, interpretation of Section 101 was simply settled law, 
based on Diehr and Chakrabarty. 
 26 The latest version of the USPTO Subject Matter Eligibility guidelines was 
published in October of 2019. Update on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 
USPTO (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/update-
patent-subject-matter-eligibility [https://perma.cc/5Z53-DTU3]. 
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protection for innovations in both the medical diagnostics and the 
wider life sciences and biotechnology industries.27 
As just one example, the United States faces the unusual specter 
of having its patent laws render a new medical diagnostic method 
for non-invasively detecting abnormalities in the fetus of a pregnant 
woman as patent ineligible subject matter, while the highest courts 
in both the United Kingdom and Australia found the same 
technology to be eligible for patent protection.28 Ceding ground to 
foreign countries in fostering new medical diagnostic technology 
development and talent retention issues aside, the less than desirable 
position we face today in the United States sees opportunistic free-
riders taking advantage of this anomaly in current U.S. patent law to 
move in, copy innovative products, and gain market share at the 
expense of our innovators. 
The reason the medical diagnostics industry is particularly 
sensitive to patent laws is because very large capital investments are 
necessary. It typically costs more than one billion dollars to develop 
a brand-new drug29 or a medical diagnostic test.30 Investors and 
company executives make decisions based on certainty and how the 
law can protect their investment from copycats. The argument raised 
by some that patents somehow block innovation and are ultimately 
of less value rings especially hollow when it is applied to the 
medical diagnostics industry. 
This article argues that for the U.S. to regain its pole position in 
the arena of technological innovation within the medical diagnostics 
industry, Congress needs to act swiftly to amend the law 
 
 27 See discussion infra Part V. 
 28 See discussion infra Part IV.b. 
 29 Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry: new 
estimates of R&D costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20–33 (May 2016). This research 
and development cost study was published by Tufts Center for the Study of Drug 
Development. 
 30 EUR. OBSERVATORY ON HEALTH SYST. & POL’Y, ENSURING INNOVATION IN 
DIAGNOSTICS FOR BACTERIAL INFECTION, EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY ON HEALTH 
SYSTEMS AND POLICIES 44 (Chantal Morel et al. eds., 2016). Rick Mullin, Cost to 
Develop New Pharmaceutical Drug Now Exceeds $2.5B, SCI. AM. (Nov. 24, 
2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/cost-to-develop-new-
pharmaceutical-drug-now-exceeds-2-5b/ [https://perma.cc/EA4M-SGCK]. 
MAR. 2020] Patent Eligibility of Disease Diagnosis 71 
highlighting that it disagrees with the Supreme Court’s recent 
trilogy of patent eligibility decisions. As a mechanism for doing so 
and given where we are, this article proffers two strategies for 
Congress to decide between in order to better determine whether a 
subject matter is eligible for patent protection. Congress should act 
by either (1) amending Section 101, or (2) by abolishing, in toto, the 
non-statutory, Supreme Court-promulgated, exceptions to this 
statute. Either path will restore a balance to the laws that both fosters 
and encourages technology innovators to develop new medical 
diagnostic technologies that address patient needs of today and 
tomorrow. 
Parts II and III of this article begin with the constitutional 
foundation of laws concerning patent eligibility and their legislative 
development. The focus then shifts to patent eligibility 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court going back over a century, 
highlighting the Court’s judicial activism in the recent trilogy of 
cases between 2012–2014, which effectively created its own 
expansive parallel set of laws alongside the statutory language 
concerning patent eligibility. 
Parts IV and V introduce the field of personalized medicine and 
medical diagnostics, later focusing in depth on how these recent 
Supreme Court decisions on patent eligibility have affected medical 
diagnostic technologies and discussing how the non-statutory, 
Supreme Court-created, exceptions to patent eligibility laws have 
negatively affected the protection and the development of such key 
emerging biomedical technologies in the United States. 
Scholars and stakeholders in the legal and biomedical 
community have begun to actively seek a fix from Congress because 
many in the biomedical community, especially those in the medical 
diagnostics industry, see the current status quo as being untenable. 
While some have proposed to keep the Supreme Court-created 
exceptions and have a “practical application” test, as thoughtfully 
proposed by other intellectual property (“IP”) law professors,31 
others, including the former Director of the U.S. Patent and 
 
 31 See Sequenom Amicus Brief, supra note 21 (focusing on arguments by 
Professors Lefstin & Menell). 
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Trademark Office, have argued for wholesale repeal of Section 101 
from the Patent Act.32 
In the penultimate section, part VI, this article concludes by 
encouraging Congress to act and bring certainty to this fundamental 
area of patent law in order to encourage innovators to once again 
invest and seek to develop new medical diagnostic technologies that 
have the potential to benefit the public. The article does not propose 
for the wholesale repealing of the statute, but advocates for avoiding 
yet another round of massaging a body of newly created law that has 
had more than five years to develop and has proved unworkable and 
difficult to apply in practice. 
None of the Supreme Court created exceptions to the patent 
eligibility statute under Section 101 are in fact necessary because 
existing statutes under the Patent Act, unrelated to Section 101, will 
address the concerns the Supreme Court had when it created the 
exceptions. The Supreme Court’s recent activism on this issue, 
which ironically the Court itself warned had the power to “swallow 
all of patent law”33 and “eviscerate patent law,”34 and the resulting 
mayhem it has now in fact caused, has greatly harmed the innovation 
ecosystem, especially damaging the medical diagnostics industry in 
the U.S. 
If the reader is left unconvinced that abolishing, in toto, the non-
statutory, Supreme Court-promulgated, exceptions to Section 101 is 
the way forward, this article also offers possible amendments to the 
law so as to defang these exceptions and bring them in line with 
 
 32 Steven Lundberg, Dave Kappos Calls for Abolition of Section 101, NAT’L L. 
REV. (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/dave-kappos-calls-
abolition-section-101 [https://perma.cc/3DDK-4YQF]. David Kappos was the 
Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office from 2009–2013. Id. 
 33 The Supreme Court advised the lower courts in Alice to “tread carefully in 
construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law.” (emphasis 
added). Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014). 
 34 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) 
(emphasis added). Two years prior to Alice, the Supreme Court in Mayo further 
warned that their own judicially created exceptions to the statute have the power 
to destroy Congress’ patent law, stating: “The Court has recognized, however, 
that too broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate 
patent law. For all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or 
apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” (emphasis added). Id. 
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what has been the intent of the Constitution and Congress for over 
200 years. In so doing, for this latter part, this article will also draw 
on and review the European Patent Convention and its view on the 
patentability of diagnostic method claims in order to provide an 
extraterritorial context and possible direction lawmakers may wish 
to explore. 
Part VI suggests ways in which this article might contribute to 
the scholarly debate by articulating the proposition that abolishing 
the non-statutory exceptions to patent eligibility laws under 
Section 101 will modernize and simplify the rules governing U.S. 
patent laws, and reverse the caustic effect of the new patent 
eligibility legal framework on the medical diagnostics industry. 
Such action would also bring back much sought-after certainty to 
current U.S. patent law, and would thereby also harmonize this 
feature of U.S. patent law with the patent laws of other industrialized 
societies much akin to how Congress harmonized important aspects 
of U.S. patent laws with patent laws of other industrialized countries 
when it passed the monumental America Invents Act in 2013. In the 
alternative, this part discusses how amendments to the existing 
statute could achieve a similar outcome. 
The enactment of America Invents Act in 2013 was a leap 
forward and so too would be significant congressional action 
concerning Section 101. This will have the knock-on effect of 
returning our laws to once again encouraging and rewarding 
entrepreneurial innovators, especially those operating in the 
personalized medicine and medical diagnostics industries, to 
develop and bring new biomedical technologies to the 
marketplace.35 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION OF 
PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER 
The U.S. Constitution gives power to Congress to “promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times 
to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
 
 35 Since the U.S. Constitution mandates Congress to enact laws to “promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts,” such action would be squarely within 
Congress’ mandate. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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writings and discoveries.”36 Thus, the U.S. Constitution not only 
grants Congress the power to create laws that promote the progress 
of science, but it also associates inventors with discoveries.37 Since 
the power that Congress has is exclusive, only lawmakers decide the 
legal mechanism by which they will promote the progress in science 
and the useful arts. One way this can be done is to first define exactly 
what kind of subject matter the country wishes to see progress in, 
and then formulate laws that are tailored to promoting progress in 
those subject matters listed.38 The focus of this paper is the patent 
eligibility statute under Section 101, with the ultimate question at 
the heart of this debate being: “what kind of subject matter is eligible 
for a patent?”39 
A. Legislative Development of Patent Eligibility Laws 
In 1790, Congress passed a law for the first time to codify what 
can and cannot be patent eligible subject matter.40 Thomas Jefferson, 
who first drafted a statute to “promote the progress of science and 
useful arts,”41 relied heavily on established English law that aimed 
“to promote the progress of science and useful arts . . . by giving the 
public at large a right to make, construct, use, and vend the thing 
invented, at as early a period as possible; having a due regard to the 
rights of the inventor.”42 Next came the Thomas Jefferson-authored 
Patent Act of 1793, which repealed the Patent Act of 1790 and 
largely embodied the ideology of older English law and ultimately 
defined patent eligible subject matter to be “any new and useful 
 
 36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (capitalization omitted). 
 37 See generally Sherry Knowles & Anthony Prosser, Unconstitutional 
Application of 35 U.S.C. § 101 by the U.S. Supreme Court, 18 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 144 (2018). 
 38 Indisputably, nowadays, Patent Law is intractably tied to new technology 
development and commercialization. 
 39 The U.S. Constitution excludes the word “patent,” but there is also no explicit 
requirement for Congress to advance certain technologies to progress science. 
 40 Pub. L. No. 1-34, 1 Stat. 109 (1790). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 18 (1829) (noting “it is obvious to the careful 
inquirer, that many of the provisions of our Patent Act are derived from the 
principles and practice which have prevailed in the construction of that of 
England.”). 
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process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any 
new or useful improvement thereof.”43 
Between 1793 and 1952, other Patent Acts were passed by 
Congress, including the Patent Acts of 1794,44 1800,45 1832,46 
1836,47 1837,48 1839,49 1842,50 1870,51 and many more. Interestingly, 
vis-à-vis the patent eligibility laws, during this 160-year period the 
kind of subject matter eligible for patent protection remained largely 
unchanged. From the 1950s to the present day, the key legislation 
passed by Congress that affected patents were the 1952 Patent Act 
and the recently enacted America Invents Act. Although the 1952 
Act added certain definitions, neither the 1952 Patent Act nor the 
recent America Invents Act changed the substance of patent 
eligibility laws as they existed in the 1790s. 
Thus, for approximately the last 230 years, from the 1790s until 
today, the area of law affecting what subject matter is eligible for a 
patent has remained largely unchanged. The current version of the 
patent eligibility statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101, states: 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.52 
The inclusion of the words “invents” and “discovers” in the 
statute has largely been deliberately consistent throughout the 
statutory language.53 The reason this is important is that the Supreme 
Court in recent years has effectively ignored the word “discovers” 
to suit their new interpretation of the statute. As an example, the 
Supreme Court recently in Myriad stated that: “[g]roundbreaking, 
innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the 
 
 43 Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. 319 (1793). 
 44 Pub. L. No. 3-58, 2 Stat. 393 (1794). 
 45 Pub. L. No. 6-25, 3 Stat. 37 (1800). 
 46 Pub. L. No. 22-162, 4 Stat. 559 (1832). 
 47 Pub. L. No. 24-357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). 
 48 Pub. L. No. 24-409, 5 Stat. 191 (1837). 
 49 Pub. L. No. 25-292, 5 Stat. 353 (1839). 
 50 Pub. L. No. 27-288, 5 Stat. 543 (1842). 
 51 Pub. L. No. 41-230, 15 Stat. 198 (1870). 
 52 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (emphasis added). 
 53 Knowles & Prosser, supra note 37. 
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§ 101 inquiry.”54 And yet, the express wording of the Section 101 
statute says otherwise: “whoever invents or discovers . . . .”55 
A key criticism of current patent eligibility laws, as articulated 
under the Supreme Court’s recent Mayo decision, is that it imports 
considerations of novelty of an invention under the patent eligible 
subject matter deliberation.56 In order to make this reasoning work, 
the Supreme Court made statements that run directly against long 
standing express statutory language by saying, for example, that just 
by discovering something you do not necessarily satisfy the 
Section 101 inquiry.57 That is even though the long-standing 
Section 101 statute expressly states that the inquiry is based on 
someone inventing or discovering any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture or composition of matter. 
Moreover, even after the Patent Act of 1793 defined statutory 
patent eligible subject matters as “any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or 
useful improvement thereof,”58 the many Patent Acts that were 
enacted in the ensuing 200 years decided to keep this express 
language of the statute unchanged. Indeed, it is also somewhat 
telling that when Thomas Jefferson authored the Patent Act of 1793, 
he had in mind that “ingenuity should receive a liberal 
encouragement.”59 Thus, when the Supreme Court first created 
exceptions to what the statute explicitly states is patent eligible 
subject matter, and now their recent wholesale expansion of the 
scope of these exceptions, it has caused a shockwave. These 
exceptions run directly against not only long standing express 
statutory language, but also against the implicit intent of Congress 
to liberally encourage ingenuity, as Jefferson had intended. 
 
 54 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad, 569 U.S. 579, 591 (2013). 
 55 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (emphasis added). 
 56 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 57 Myriad, 569 U.S. at 591 (“Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant 
discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”). 
 58 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
 59 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75–76 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 
1903). See Knowles & Prosser, supra note 37 for a more detailed and thorough 
discussion on the legislative history of § 101. 
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The statutory intent is and has been for over 200 years to set a 
low threshold to patent eligible subject matter. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court itself decades ago recognized this when stating that this 
includes “anything under the sun made by man.”60 Yet, in direct 
contrast to the express statutory language found in Section 101, its 
legislative history and Congress’s intent, and past Supreme Court 
precedent, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has evolved to now 
put a very high bar on a previously low threshold Section 101 
inquiry as to what subject matter is even eligible for a patent. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM CONCERNING PATENT ELIGIBILITY LAWS 
Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the 
power “to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by 
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries.”61 With this as the 
backdrop, it may be counterintuitive to the non-patent scholar to 
learn that even if an invention is found to be novel, to be nonobvious, 
to have utility, and to meet all of the technical requirements for a 
patent, a patent will still not issue unless, as a preliminary threshold 
matter, the invention is directed to subject matter that the Patent Act, 
under Section 101, has defined to be patent eligible subject matter.62 
Thus, this topic of patent eligibility is of fundamental importance 
because of the direct nature in which it affects patent procurement 
and enforceability, and ultimately the progress of technological 
innovation in the United States. 
A. 19th and 20th Century Decisions on Patent Eligible Subject 
Matter 
Le Roy v. Tatham63 is the oldest of three key patent eligibility 
cases handed down by the Supreme Court in the 19th century. A 
quote that is used regularly by more recent cases from both the 
 
 60 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
 61 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (capitalization omitted). 
 62 See generally PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (2019) (providing a discussion of the evolution of the 
patentable subject matter doctrine). 
 63 Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852). 
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Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit referencing this decision is 
that “a principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original 
cause; a motive; and these cannot be patented, as no one can claim 
in either of them an exclusive right.”64 In that same decade, the 
telegraph case O’Reilly v. Morse65 was decided. There, Morse sued 
O’Reilly for patent infringement based on a technology that allowed 
for long distance transmission of a telegraph signal.66 The Supreme 
Court noted that Morse’s broad patent claim was not enabled 
because he enabled only electromagnetic repeaters.67 Drawing from 
the older Neilson decision from England,68 the Supreme Court 
concluded that Morse’s patent claim addresses all possible 
applications of a physical principle, not a specific implementation 
of the principle. Thus, the Court found the patent claim to be 
ineligible subject matter. 
The third notable case from the 19th century is Tilghman v. 
Proctor.69 In Tilghman, the claim was to a method of making fatty 
acids and glycerin using hot water at a high pressure.70 The Supreme 
Court, drawing on their earlier decision in Morse, clarified that a 
patent for a process is different from a patent to a scientific principle 
and that a scientific principle itself is not patent eligible subject 
matter.71 The Court explained that a patent claim fails if it is not a 
claim to a particular machine, or a claim to a specific process for 
utilizing a scientific principle.72 
In the 20th century, the Supreme Court decided three key cases 
related to patent eligibility in the 1970s, namely Gottschalk v. 
 
 64 Id. at 175. 
 65 O’Reilly v Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853). 
 66 Id. 
 67 “Eighth. I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts 
of machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of 
my invention being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, 
which I call electro-magnetism, however developed for marking or printing 
intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances, being a new application 
of that power of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.” Id. 
 68 Neilson v. Harford, 151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (1841). 
 69 Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 726–29. 
 72 Id. 
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Benson,73 Parker v. Flook,74 and Diamond v. Diehr.75 For the latter 
half of the 20th century, these three cases provided much of the 
framework for the Court’s view on patent eligibility requirement 
under Section 101. That framework fundamentally changed when 
the Supreme Court decided a trilogy of patent eligibility cases within 
a three-year period between 2012–2014,76 discussed infra in part IV. 
In Benson,77 the Supreme Court decided on the patentability of 
software, holding that a patent on a method for converting numbers 
from one binary format to another format was invalid. Justice 
Douglas, writing for the majority, articulated that “the mathematical 
formula involved here has no substantial practical application except 
in connection with a digital computer.”78 Mathematical algorithms, 
according to the Court, were not eligible subject matter for patent 
protection because if a patent were allowed it would “wholly pre-
empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a 
patent on the algorithm itself.”79 Although the Court had earlier 
distinguished scientific principles, such as laws of nature, from the 
practical application of those scientific principles,80 the Benson 
decision was the first instance in which the Supreme Court described 
abstract ideas as a separate category of patent ineligible subject 
matter.81 
Thus, after Benson, in contrast to an invention, algorithms were 
treated as laws of nature and the algorithm itself being treated as 
nothing more than a discovery of a fundamental truth and therefore 
making it ineligible subject matter for patenting. What to this day 
remains confusing about Benson is that although the Court found a 
mathematical algorithm (computer program) to be patent ineligible 
subject matter, the Court suggested it would allow a patent that 
 
 73 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 74 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 75 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 76 The Mayo/Myriad/Alice patent eligibility trio of cases from the Supreme 
Court, decided in 2012–14. 
 77 Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852). 
 81 Benson, 409 U.S. at 63. 
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covered a “program servicing a computer.”82 This is especially 
resonant since a computer program or software is nothing more than 
a complex mathematical algorithm, instructing a computer to solve 
a problem (thus akin to “servicing a computer” recited in Benson). 
In Flook, a decision that was effectively overruled by the Court 
in two subsequent decisions, Chakrabarty and Diehr, the patent 
application was for a method of updating alarm limits.83 Flook’s 
method was identical to previous systems, but for a mathematical 
algorithm.84 Here, the Flook Court compared its own ruling in 
Benson some six years earlier to the specific application of the 
algorithm in Flook for catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons.85 
Relying on the English Neilson86 decision and its progeny, the Court 
found Flook’s patent claim did not contain patent eligible subject 
matter because it was a “principle” or a “law of nature.”87 
The Supreme Court in Flook took the controversial position and 
focused on the “inventive concept”88 and not on the patent claim “as 
a whole.”89 The Court opined that “even though a phenomenon of 
nature or mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive 
application of the principle may be patented. Conversely, the 
discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless 
there is some other inventive concept in its application.”90 
Interestingly, although Chakrabarty91 and Diehr92 effectively 
overruled Flook later in the 20th century, the Flook holding and 
reasoning is making a strong revival as evidenced by how favorably 
recent Supreme Court decisions in Bilski in 2010 and Mayo in 2012 
both looked upon and aligned with the Flook decision. Yet, in many 
 
 82 Id. at 71. 
 83 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 588–90. 
 86 Neilson v. Harford, 151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (1841). 
 87 Flook, 437 U.S. at 592. 
 88 Id. at 594. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. (emphasis added). 
 91 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
 92 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186–87 (1981). 
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instances the lower courts continue to ignore Flook and follow Diehr 
and Chakrabarty, and the recently decided Mayo and Alice cases.93 
The Supreme Court decided Diehr three years after Flook. 
Diehr’s invention used a computer program to determine the curing 
time for rubber, allowing better precision molded rubber products to 
be made.94 The invention included a software algorithm to run a 
molding press, thereby achieving a specific result of curing rubber. 
The Court held that the computer program that executed the physical 
method was patent eligible subject matter, noting that although 
software algorithms could not be patented, the mere presence of a 
software element did not make an otherwise patent-eligible machine 
or process an ineligible subject matter for patenting. 
Unlike the method claims in Benson and Flook, the Diehr Court 
found the method to be patent eligible subject matter because the 
claims did not “foreclose from others the use of that equation in 
conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process”95 
when they were “considered as a whole.”96 Thus, the Diehr Court 
focused on the implementation of the algorithm and how it applied 
in the method; more particularly, whether, as the Court noted, the 
mathematical algorithm “transform[s] and reduces . . . an article ‘to 
a different state or thing.’”97 The Supreme Court reiterated its 
position in Diehr that abstract mathematical formulas are patent 
ineligible subject matter, and that using such a formula in a physical 
machine or process is different to a claim solely to the algorithm 
itself. 
Interestingly, from each of Benson, Flook and Diehr decisions 
spanning a decade that focused on patent eligibility, a different 
interpretation emerged of the statutory law governing patent eligible 
subject matter, namely Section 101. However, from the most 
recently decided Diehr decision of this trilogy of cases, one could 
adduce the Court as highlighting two traditional understandings 
 
 93 See infra Part IV. 
 94 U.S. Patent No. 4,344,142, directed to “Direct digital control of rubber 
molding presses” (filed Aug. 6, 1975). 
 95 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187. 
 96 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978). 
 97 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184. 
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concerning patent eligibility. First, that abstract principles are not 
patent eligible, even though practical applications of those 
principles are patent eligible,98 and second that related issues, 
novelty, obviousness or inventiveness should play no role in 
determining patent eligibility under Section 101.99 
Between 1981, when the Diehr decision was handed down, to 
2010, the Supreme Court did not address a patent eligibility issue 
under Section 101. This resulted in stakeholders and patent 
professionals believing that the patent eligibility laws articulated in 
those cases had generally settled and could be relied upon. During 
this thirty-year period, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
interpreting the patent eligible subject matter under Section 101, 
began to interpret and rely on Diehr to broaden the scope of patent 
eligible subject matter. For example, in the years between the Diehr 
decision in 1981 and the Bilski decision in 2010, the Federal Circuit 
found business method claims that were previously patent ineligible 
subject matter were now patent eligible if the method achieved a 
“useful, concrete and tangible result.”100 
This expansive radical move by the Federal Circuit in State 
Street101 was eyebrow raising and although some commentators saw 
this as demonstrating the Federal Circuit’s ability to be nimble and 
flexible in the era of newly emerging innovative technologies and 
 
 98 Id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or 
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of 
patent protection.”); Id. at 191 (“We recognize, of course, that when a claim 
recites a mathematical formula (or scientific principle or phenomenon of nature), 
an inquiry must be made into whether the claim is seeking patent protection for 
that formula in the abstract.”). 
 99 Id. at 188–89 (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of 
the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of 
a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”). 
 100 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 
1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 
1994)). 
 101 State Street overruled the Freeman-Walter-Abele Test, noting it had “little, 
if any, applicability to determining the presence of statutory subject matter.” Id. 
at 1374. Yet, the court in State Street set forth a “‘useful, concrete, and tangible 
result[s]’” test. Id. at 1373 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544). The Supreme 
Court never accepted this test, questioning its viability. See Lab. Corp. of Am. 
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006). 
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all the while in keeping with the Supreme Court’s Diehr decision, 
the reality of what transpired was completely different. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in State Street 
to correct the mistake.102 Therefore, what transpired after the Federal 
Circuit’s expansion of what constitutes patent eligible subject matter 
in State Street was a surge in a plethora of business method patent 
applications on anything from offering legal services to even 
services aimed at booking lavatories. Relying on the Federal 
Circuit’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s Diehr decision, the 
majority of IP stakeholders, between the 1999 State Street decision 
and 2010, regarded patent eligibility under Section 101 to be a 
“coarse filter”103 through which the vast majority of patent 
applications pass with very few patent office rejections. Issues 
related to patent eligibility were simply not something to give too 
much attention to during that period. 
Yet, all this fundamentally changed when the Supreme Court, 
silent for thirty years on patent eligibility, rendered four patent 
eligibility decisions spanning 2010−2014, with Bilski being the 
first.104 
B. 21st Century Decisions on Patent Eligible Subject Matter: 
Expansion of the Judicially Created Exceptions 
The Supreme Court decided Bilski some thirty years after their 
Diehr decision. The patent claims at issue in Bilski 105 centered on a 
method for hedging risk in trading commodities. The Federal Circuit 
heard the case en banc, perhaps wishing to amend their State Street 
decision which had opened the flood gates for patenting a plethora 
of ways of doing business. The Federal Circuit agreed with the 
USPTO, and in tune with Supreme Court precedent, held that such 
methods can be patented only if they are implemented by a machine 
or transform something into a new or different thing. The Court 
found Bilski’s method was not patent eligible subject matter because 
“transformations or manipulations of . . . business risks or other such 
 
 102 See State Street Bank and Trust Co., 525 U.S. 1093 (denying petition for 
writ of certiorari). 
 103 Res. Corp. Tech. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 104 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 105 Id. 
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abstractions cannot meet the test because they are not physical 
objects or substances.”106 Although the Federal Circuit reaffirmed 
that business methods are still patentable, the Court rejected their 
own “useful concrete and tangible result” test in State Street on the 
basis that their earlier State Street decision had resulted in patents 
being issued on everyday activities that had no connection to 
innovation in new technologies.107 
In Bilski, the Supreme Court issued a total of three opinions, 
consisting of a plurality opinion for the Court and two concurring 
opinions. In its plurality opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
Federal Circuit’s rejection of Bilski’s patent claims, but for different 
reasons than the lower court. The Supreme Court in Bilski held that 
the Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-transformation” test is merely “a 
useful and important clue, an investigative tool” for patentability but 
not the sole or exclusive test for identifying patentable methods. 
Thus, the Supreme Court’s failure to provide a bright-line workable 
Section 101 framework effectively forced lower courts to decipher 
what is and is not patent eligible subject matter without a definitive 
test.108 
The uncertainty of the Bilski decision did not last long because 
two years after deciding Bilski, the Supreme Court decided the 
seminal Mayo decision. In Mayo, the technology related to medical 
diagnostic technologies. Here, the Court used their Mayo decision109 
to fundamentally and radically change the scope of patent eligible 
subject matter, thereby substantially changing the foundation for 
how stakeholders in the personalized medicine, biotechnology and 
medical diagnostic fields would come to view the protectability of 
new developments and innovation in these technologies. 
 
 106 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962–63 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 107 Id. at 959–60 (citing State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial 
Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 108 Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer 
to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity 
to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN L. REV. 1289, 1304 
(2011) (stating “the Supreme Court’s methodology and analysis for determining 
whether a process falls within the scope of patentable subject matter could hardly 
be more opaque.”). 
 109 See discussion infra Part IV.b. 
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IV. PATENT ELIGIBILITY OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSTIC 
TECHNOLOGIES 
A. A Primer on Biotechnology, Personalized Medicine & Medical 
Diagnostic Technologies 
To give context to how the recent changes to patent eligibility 
laws discussed in this Article affect newly emerging technologies, I 
here focus on the field of personalized medicine, medical 
diagnostics and innovative technologies grounded in the field of 
biotechnology. One of the primary reasons why innovation in the 
biotechnology field is sensitive to and has been affected by the 
recent changes in patent eligibility laws is because, at its core, there 
is a close relationship between inventions in the biotechnological 
field, including those in medical diagnostics, and the laws of nature 
and natural phenomena they rely on. Thus, in order for the non-
technical reader to appreciate the interplay between technology and 
law in this context, in this section, a brief overview of the medical 
technology is discussed. 
Personalized medicine is an emerging model for treating and 
preventing disease that takes into account each person’s genetic 
variations, environment, and lifestyle. Medical diagnostic tests now 
allow for the use of a patient’s unique genetic profile to diagnose 
disease,110 identify risk factors for genetic transmission of 
diseases,111 assess possible future likelihood of a disease 
occurring,112 and also intelligence in devising treatments.113 Not long 
after the seminal Mayo decision, discussed in detail below, and 
recognizing this buzz around the field of personalized medicine and 
the emerging medical diagnostic technologies it relies upon, 
 
 110 See, e.g., Testing For CF, CYSTIC FIBROSIS FOUND., 
https://www.cff.org/What-is-CF/Testing [perma.cc/42NG-3NMX] (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2020). 
 111 See, e.g., Learning About Tay-Sachs Disease, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. 
INST. (Mar. 17, 2011), https://www.genome.gov/10001220 [perma.cc/U347-
UGFC]. 
 112 Genetic Testing FAQ, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., 
https://www.genome.gov/FAQ/Genetic-Testing [perma.cc/6GRN-J3RZ] (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2019). 
 113 Margaret A. Hamburg & Francis S. Collins, The Path to Personalized 
Medicine, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 301, 301 (2010). 
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President Obama announced in his 2015 State of the Union address 
that the U.S. government would fund an “All of US” initiative114 to 
enroll at least one million people into a personalized medicine 
initiative115 in which ten years of medical information is captured 
and shared.116 
The idea behind President Obama’s initiative has been to use the 
power of the collective data to better understand the biology and 
pathogenesis of a disease and be in a position to provide better 
patient care and outcomes. Various technologies developed over the 
last decade have made such an initiative possible, including for 
example low cost high throughput DNA sequencing technologies117 
and other genome-based technology platforms used to classify 
certain disease stages using medical diagnostic tests to predict the 
likelihood of future clinical outcomes, as prognostic tests. 
The novel concept behind personalized medicine is to tailor 
therapeutic strategies, be they for treatment or prevention purposes, 
based on an individual’s genomic and proteomic profile. This 
rapidly evolving approach to medicine is proving to be 
transformational for medical interventions. With the ever increasing 
stratification of patients based on their molecular makeup, for 
example looking for mutations present in certain genes which would 
indicate a drug would not work on a given patient, and government 
support of initiatives such as the “All of US” mentioned previously, 
 
 114 National Institutes of Health, All of Us Research Program, 
https://allofus.nih.gov/ [perma.cc/RS8V-K6NE] (last visited Dec. 12, 2019). 
 115 Digital Health Market Size Worth $509.2 Billion By 2025, GRAND VIEW 
RES. (May 2019), https://www.grandviewresearch.com/press-release/global-
digital-health-market [perma.cc/7XD7-5WFD] (last visited Dec. 12, 2019). 
 116 In 2015, President Obama announced in his State of the Union address the 
launch of the Precision Medicine Initiative, a bold new way to revolutionize how 
we improve health and treat disease (“Doctors have always recognized that every 
patient is unique, and doctors have always tried to tailor their treatments as best 
they can to individuals. You can match a blood transfusion to a blood type - that 
was an important discovery. What if matching a cancer cure to our genetic code 
was just as easy, just as standard? What if figuring out the right dose of medicine 
was as simple as taking our temperature?”). President Barack Obama, State of the 
Union Address (Jan. 30, 2015). 
 117 The Cost of Sequencing a Human Genome, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. 
INST., https://www.genome.gov/27565109/the-cost-of-sequencing-a-human-
genome/ [https://perma.cc/VY2H-ZSLL] (last updated Oct. 30, 2019). 
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physicians are becoming increasingly more able to better tailor 
treatment strategies on a case by case basis. It is thus likely that the 
rise in the development of emerging new medical diagnostic 
technologies within the era of personalized medicine will result in 
the ability of physicians to select drugs based on a patient’s 
underlying genetic makeup. Such tests will allow for periodic 
molecular profiling of people to move their health care strategies 
from acute intervention and disease management to proactive 
management of disease risk and prevention. 
The success of personalized medicine hinges on new and 
innovative medical diagnostic technologies, involving for example 
genomic testing technologies.118 Indeed, medical diagnostic 
technologies already play an important role in the practice of 
medicine, impacting as high as 70 percent of health care decision 
making.119 The concept is to use such medical diagnostic tests in the 
field of personalized medicine, such that a patient receives the right 
drug at the right dose at the right time.120 For example, in medicine, 
pharmacogenomics, a field that is highly relevant to personalized 
medicine, is increasingly being used in clinics to study genetic 
information of an individual before making drug choice and drug 
dose decisions.121 Different mutations in certain genes can present 
similarly in patients, and yet each patient will only respond to 
different treatments (drug efficacy between patients with same gene 
mutation being different).122 
Medical diagnostic tests are generally used in clinical medical 
practice to identify the patient’s condition and therefore provide for 
early and effective treatment of the particular disease at hand. Being 
able to provide an accurate medical diagnostic test that has a small 
 
 118 Margaret A. Hamburg & Francis S. Collins, The Path to Personalized 
Medicine, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 301, 301 (2010). 
 119 KEWAL K. JAIN, TEXTBOOK OF PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 91–96 (2d. ed. 
2015). 
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[https://perma.cc/X5TQ-GZZ7]. 
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probability of missing a diagnosis, or making an error in the 
diagnosis, or a making a delayed diagnosis are all crucial features in 
the management of a disease.123 These medical diagnostic tests help 
in better understanding a patient’s condition, predict clinical 
outcomes, select personalized medical treatment protocols, and to 
determine if a treatment is working. Thus, the commercialization of 
molecular medical diagnostic technologies has greatly expanded the 
field of pharmacogenetics, the application of which is now 
increasingly adopted in personalized medicine to address a patient’s 
condition.124 
In a medical clinical setting, such medical diagnostic tests can 
be used to confirm/exclude, triage, monitor, prognose, or screen for 
a particular marker or condition. For example, a diagnostic test can 
confirm or exclude that a patient has a particular disease, or a test 
could be used repeatedly to monitor how effective a concurrent 
treatment is, or assess the progression and/or outcome of a disease, 
or screen for a disease condition in people who do not show 
outwardly any symptoms. Thus, the breadth and impact of the 
medical diagnostic field in being able to provide better patient care 
is enormous. Having a robust, accurate and precise medical 
diagnostic test that is readily repeatable and reproducible is a 
significant technological leap forward in the process of managing 
health outcomes in patients. In this emerging new technological era 
of advanced medical diagnostic technologies, the vision is to 
provide “the right drug, with the right dose at the right time to the 
right patient.”125 The question is: how does the new patent eligibility 
law interplay with innovations in this personalized medicine and 
medical diagnostics field? 
 
 123 G. D. Schiff et al., Diagnostic Error in Medicine: Analysis of 583 Physician-
Reported Errors, 169 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1881–87 (2009). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
MAR. 2020] Patent Eligibility of Disease Diagnosis 89 
B. Patent Eligibility of Diagnostic Method Claims: The Problem 
with Mayo Expanding the “Law of Nature” Exception and 
Myriad Expanding the “Natural Phenomena” Exception 
Protecting medical diagnostic technologies by permitting their 
patenting is a desirable outcome, albeit one can understand the need 
to proceed with caution when establishing an overly inclusive 
system that allows a monopoly on such medical techniques. Medical 
diagnostic technologies can be used to capture a number of practical 
applications, including testing to identify certain characteristics that 
can then help deliver better health outcomes in patients. 
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Mayo and Myriad, 
discussed infra, are two seminal decisions addressing the patent 
eligibility question of biotechnological innovations, including 
patent claims to emerging medical diagnostic technologies. After 
deciding Bilski in 2010, discussed supra, the Supreme Court turned 
its attention to a subcategory of innovative and financially lucrative 
technologies within the biomedical sector, namely the patent 
eligibility of emerging medical diagnostic technologies. In three 
short years, the Supreme Court decided three patent eligibility cases 
that would significantly impact this industry, starting with the 
decision in Mayo.126 Mayo showcased the Court’s ill-advised radical 
shift away from its own precedent and away from the express 
language in the statute. 
The Supreme Court created judicial exceptions to statutory 
language primarily to prevent patents from monopolizing “the basic 
tools of scientific and technological work.”127 The context for the 
Supreme Court’s recent radical shift on this issue of patent eligibility 
is likely a result of several converging factors, including the fact that 
many on the patent bar had voiced an opinion that as a direct result 
of the Federal Circuit’s expansive interpretation of the Supreme 
Court’s Diehr decision over many years, a glut of superfluous low 
quality patents had issued and that this ultimately had a chilling 
effect on the advancement of technological innovation in America. 
 
 126 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
 127 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) 
(quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 
589 (2013)). 
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Some scholars have argued that well above 90 percent of patents 
are never actually commercialized in any way.128 Although the lack 
of commercialization of the majority of patents does not necessarily 
damage the structure of incentives and rewards in the United States’ 
patent system by themselves, the recent bundling of these 
superfluous patents and their assertion by non-practicing entities 
(“NPEs”) against companies producing products has become cause 
for concern.129 Moreover, the 2016 Federal Trade Commission 
report on Patent Assertion Entities also concluded that the high 
number of low quality patents and their assertion by NPEs is a 
nuisance business model.130 Further still, the USPTO has faced 
criticism for enabling this landscape by granting poor quality 
patents, with a government report, issued by GAO during the same 
time as the Supreme Court decisions analyzed herein, specifically 
pointing out that a glut of poor quality issued patents was hurting 
the patent ecosystem,131 and yet others highlighting that low quality 
 
 128 Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L. FIN. 250, 264 
(2013) (“The vast majority of patents have never directly earned a return for the 
patent holder. Estimates suggest that the number is well above 90%.”); see also 
Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA L. REV. 
1, 5 (2005) (estimating that less than 5 percent of patents hold any value). 
 129 Id. at 254, 267–68 (“We need a mechanism for restraining inappropriate use 
of intellectual property and for signaling the difference between the acceptable 
pursuit of a return from your intellectual property and the inappropriate 
oppression of others, using the legal system and societally granted privileges as a 
weapon.”); see also Mark A. Lemley & Robin Feldman, Is Patent Enforcement 
Efficient?, 98 B.U. L. REV. 649, 658 (2018). 
 130 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC 
STUDY 8 (2016) (“Ninety-three percent of reported Litigation [Patent Assertion 
Entity] licenses followed a lawsuit against the eventual licensee and 77% were 
valued at less than the estimated cost of defending a patent lawsuit through the 
end of discovery—a threshold below which litigation settlements might be 
considered nuisance value.”). 
 131 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 32 (2013) (“The prevalence 
of low quality patents was driving recent increases in litigation more than PME 
suits.”). 
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patents in the biotechnology and medical diagnostic industries 
helped push up drug prices and cause public outrage.132 
i. Mayo and Expanding the “Law of Nature” Exception 
It is into this context that the first of the Mayo trilogy of cases 
was born, the ultimate result of which has been to make it much 
harder to obtain a patent. In Mayo, the Supreme Court drew on old 
case law, including from an old English case Neilson,133 as well as 
from its own precedent in O’Reilly134 and Funk Brothers135 to 
propose that the real test for determining patent eligible subject 
matter under Section 101 was not whether the patent claim had a 
practical application, but rather whether the patent claim had an 
inventive application of an underlying principle.136 As is explained 
infra,137 this is seen by many as a radical shift and damaging to 
several technological industries, including being especially 
damaging to emerging medical diagnostics technologies. 
In Mayo, the invention was directed to a method for optimizing 
the efficacy of a drug given to a patient. In particular, the patent 
claimed methods for calibrating the dosage of thiopurine drugs used 
for treating certain autoimmune diseases, including gastrointestinal 
disorders.138 In effect, the method involved the doctor administering 
 
 132 Robin Feldman et al., Empirical Evidence of Drug Pricing Games - A 
Citizen’s Pathway Gone Astray, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 39, 42 (2017) 
(“Anecdotal evidence has percolated in recent years about new forms of strategic 
behavior designed to keep drug prices artificially inflated by blocking generic 
entry.”). 
 133 Neilson v. Harford, 151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (1841). 
 134 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853). 
 135 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). In this 
case, the inventor did not create the strains of bacteria and the strains that were 
central to this invention, and therefore were ‘phenomena of nature’ and 
unpatentable. While mixing different strains into one product was an application 
of the natural phenomena, the invention was deemed unpatentable subject matter 
because it amounted to no more than an alternate way to package the product. 
 136 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–
73 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 137 See discussion infra Part IV.b.ii. 
 138 The independent patent claim at issue in Mayo recited a method of 
optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated 
gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: (a) administering a drug providing 6-
thioguanine to a subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; 
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the drug, waiting for the drug to be metabolized by the body, and 
then taking a blood sample to see if the metabolite of the drug was 
high or low. Based on this reading of the metabolite level, a decision 
was then made whether to administer more or less of the drug to the 
patient. Thus, the patent claimed measuring metabolites of the drug 
to optimize therapeutic efficacy and at the same time minimize 
toxicity and side effects. 
However, the Supreme Court found Mayo’s patent claims139 “do 
nothing more than simply describe the natural relationships between 
concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood 
that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause 
harm,”140 stating further that correlating levels of a drug metabolite 
in blood with either an overdose or underdose of the drug is 
ineligible subject matter for patenting because it is a law of nature.141 
The Mayo Court went on to articulate its belief that, when a method 
involves a natural law or abstract idea, it must also contain “an 
inventive concept,” which the Court defined as “other elements or a 
combination of elements . . . sufficient to ensure that the patent in 
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural 
law itself.”142 The Court compared the Mayo patent claim to its past 
precedent in both Diehr143 and Flook,144 concluding that the patent 
claims provide mere “instructions” and that “because methods for 
 
and (b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said 
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, wherein the level of 6-thioguanine 
less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to increase 
the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject and wherein 
the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells 
indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently administered 
to said subject. 
 139 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 77 (the Court explaining that “The relation is a consequence of the 
ways in which thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body—entirely 
natural processes. And so a patent that simply describes that relation sets forth a 
natural law.”). 
 142 Id. at 72–73 (emphasis added). 
 143 See Diamond v. Deihr, 450 U.S. 175, 192–93 (1981) (holding subject matter 
patent eligible). 
 144 See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (holding subject matter patent 
ineligible). 
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making such determinations were well known in the art, this step 
simply tells doctors to engage in well-understood, routine, 
conventional activity previously engaged in by scientists in the field. 
Such activity is normally not sufficient to transform an unpatentable 
law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law.”145 
Thus, in Mayo, the Supreme Court articulated that the test for 
determining patent eligible subject matter under Section 101 was 
not whether the patent claim had a practical application, but rather 
whether the patent claim had an inventive application of an 
underlying principle. The U.S. government had filed an amicus 
curiae in this case, advising the Court to adhere to the statutory 
language and to keep a low threshold for determining patent eligible 
subject matter, arguing that the higher bars to patentability in other 
parts of the Patent Act are best suited for the task for determining 
patentability,146 namely novelty under Section 102 and obviousness 
under Section 103. Yet, the Supreme Court decided against the 
government’s position and by articulating their new position in 
Mayo, the Supreme Court effectively vastly increased the scope of 
the Court’s own created exceptions to the express language of the 
statute that outlines what is and is not patent eligible subject matter. 
ii. Myriad and Expanding the “Product of Nature” Exception 
Just one year after the controversial Mayo decision, the Supreme 
Court decided another patent eligibility case related to biomedical 
technologies when it decided Myriad.147 In Myriad, the Court 
addressed the controversial issue of whether certain genomic 
inventions were patent eligible subject matter. The Supreme Court 
held that genomic DNA was subject matter that is ineligible for a 
patent under Section 101 because of the “product of nature” judicial 
exception. Prior to this decision, courts took the view that such 
claims would be patent eligible if the claim included significant 
 
 145 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 67. 
 146 Patentability and patent eligibility are two different concepts, with the 
former focusing most on legal issues of novelty (Section 102 of the Patent Act) 
and non-obviousness (Section 103 of the Patent Act) and the latter focusing on 
patent eligible subject matter (Section 101 of the Patent Act). 
 147 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 
(2013). 
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artificial changes made to the product of nature, perhaps by 
purifying, isolating or altering in any way. 
This “product of nature” exclusion to patent eligible subject 
matter had previously denied patent protection to plant extracts,148 
naturally occurring metals,149 and novel mixtures of existing 
bacteria.150 Yet, the courts created a significant exception allowing 
an isolated and purified natural product to be patent-eligible. For 
example, Judge Learned Hand in Parke-Davis held that isolating 
and purifying adrenaline from animal glands made it patent eligible 
subject matter despite it being a natural product.151 However, the 
contours of this exception all changed with the arrival of Myriad. 
Myriad followed just one year after the alarming Mayo decision. 
In Myriad, the overarching technology related to the eligibility of 
isolated DNA sequences, namely BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, 
methods for predicting the likelihood of cancer developing in a 
patient by examining mutations in those genes, and also methods to 
identify anti-cancer drugs using the isolated DNA sequences.152 At 
its core, Myriad involved the discovery that certain mutations in 
these two genes are associated with a predisposition of a patient to 
developing breast and ovarian cancer.153 Myriad’s invention 
represented a significant advancement in cancer treatment. Yet, as 
soon as Myriad began its commercialization strategy, there was 
widespread public outcry.154 A group of medical professionals, 
 
 148 Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 123. 
 149 Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 642 (3d Cir. 1928). 
 150 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
 151 Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1911). 
 152 See patent claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 20 of U.S. Patent No.: 5,747,282; and 
patent claims 1, 6, and 7 of U.S. Patent No.: 5,837,492. 
 153 For example, claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 recites: “An isolated 
DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide having the [following] 
amino acid sequence . . . .” For the sake of transparency, the author of this article 
was a member of the IP law group of a large international law firm in NYC that 
developed the patent portfolio for this innovator concerning their breast and 
ovarian cancer technology. 
 154  E. Richard Gold & Julia Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy 
Storm, 12 GENETICS IN MEDICINES 38, S41, S43 (2010), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3037261/ 
[https://perma.cc/QV7T-QCQX]. 
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joined by other entities, sued Myriad and sought to invalidate its 
patents on Section 101 grounds, arguing that isolated DNA is a 
product of nature and therefore is patent ineligible subject matter.155 
On appeal, ignoring three decades of practice to the contrary, the 
Supreme Court held that while claims directed specifically to the 
complementary DNA (cDNA) for the breast cancer genes, BRCA1 
and BRCA2, were patent-eligible, claims to an isolated nucleic acid 
encoding the BRCA1/2 genes were not patent eligible because they 
are “a natural product.”156 Consistent with its previous decision in 
Mayo, in which the court expanded its “law of nature” exception157 
to patent eligible subject matter, in Myriad the Supreme Court 
expanded its “product of nature” exception158 to patent eligible 
subject matter under Section 101.159 With this Myriad decision, the 
Supreme Court reversed thirty years of USPTO practice of granting 
exactly that kind of patent for isolated nucleic acid sequences that 
now the Court was deciding was ineligible subject matter. To 
highlight the weight of this decision, the USPTO had issued over 
50,000 U.S. patents relating in part to DNA160 and all of these were 
now subject to this seesaw reversal because of this expansion to the 
“natural product” exception under this newly decided expansive 
Myriad decision. 
Immediately following Myriad, the Federal Circuit began to 
invalidate patents en masse.161 The problem with expanding the 
scope of the judicially created exceptions to statutory patent eligible 
subject matter can be seen by assessing, for example, the effect of 
this radical change in patent law on the medical diagnostic 
 
 155 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 
F. Supp. 2d 181, 186–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 156 Id.; see generally Evan H. Tallmadge, Patenting Natural Products After 
Myriad, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569 (2017). 
 157 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 189. 
 158 In this paper, “product of nature” and “natural phenomena” are used 
interchangeably. 
 159 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 569 U.S. 576, 
579 (2013). 
 160 Guyan Lian, Molecules or Carriers of Biological Information: A Chemist’s 
Perspective on the Patentability of Isolated Genes, 22 ALBANY L.J. SCI. AND 
TECH. 133 (2012). 
 161 Genetic Tech. Ltd. v. Merial LLC, 818 F. 3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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technologies. In one example, when Professor Dennis Lo and 
colleagues at Oxford University discovered that cell-free fetal DNA 
(cffDNA) could be detected in the plasma and serum of pregnant 
women, they obtained U.S., European and Australian patents for 
their novel methods of detecting this cffDNA using standard 
techniques.162 The center piece of this new medical diagnostic 
technology was the ability to now more accurately and less 
invasively detect abnormalities and characteristics of unborn 
children by taking a simple blood test from the pregnant mother, 
without having to risk complications to the unborn fetus and 
pregnant mother by inserting a needle into the mother’s uterus and 
puncturing the amniotic sac by amniocentesis to take a sample of 
amniotic fluid for further testing.163 In the U.S., the Federal Circuit 
in Ariosa invalidated claims for these non-invasive methods of 
detecting cffDNA from a blood sample of a pregnant woman.164 
According to the court, the only new and useful subject matter in the 
method “was the discovery of the presence of cffDNA in maternal 
plasma or serum.”165 In contrast to the legal position in the United 
States, this same technology, as will be discussed further infra,166 
was recently found to be patent eligible subject matter by both the 
High Courts of the United Kingdom and also Australia.167 
Judge Linn indicated that Ariosa “represents the consequence—
perhaps unintended—of that broad language in [Mayo] excluding a 
meritorious invention from the patent protection it deserves.”168 
Indeed, he indicated that he concurred “only because” he was bound 
by the breadth of Mayo.169 Moreover, once a hearing en banc was 
denied in Ariosa, several Judges on the Federal Circuit also used the 
opportunity to express concern that such discoveries were not able 
to overcome the Supreme Court’s very high new bar to what the 
 
 162 See Y. M. Dennis Lo et al., Presence of Fetal DNA in Maternal Plasma and 
Serum, 350 THE LANCET 485 (1997). 
 163 Id. 
 164 Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 165 Id. at 1377 
 166 See discussion infra Part VI.b. 
 167 See Part VI.b on harmonizing patent eligibility laws. 
 168 Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1380 (Linn, J., concurring). 
 169 Id. 
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Court unilaterally had opined is and is not patent eligible subject 
matter. For example, Judge Lourie stated that “it is unsound to have 
a rule that takes inventions of this nature out of the realm of patent-
eligibility.”170 Similarly, Judge Dyk contended that “we are bound 
by the language of Mayo, and any further guidance must come from 
the Supreme Court.”171 On appeal, the Supreme Court passed on the 
opportunity to correct its decision in Mayo by denying certiorari in 
Ariosa in 2016, a decision that disappointed many observers because 
even though there were 23 amicus briefs filed encouraging the Court 
to grant certiorari in Ariosa, the Supreme Court did not even ask the 
Solicitor General’s opinion.172 
Some scholars have argued that the impact of Myriad raises 
serious questions about the patent eligibility of biotechnological 
products, including diagnostic methods.173 However, other scholars 
have disagreed, at least in regards to the extent to which the Myriad 
decision upends the biotechnological sector.174 What most scholars 
agree with is that the Mayo decision was inelegantly decided and 
poses a serious threat to the biotechnology industry.175 
 
 170 Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc. 809 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (Lourie, J., concurring). 
 171 Id. (Dyk, J., concurring). 
 172 Albeit, that stance may be changing since the Supreme Court recently asked 
for the Solicitor General’s decision on two patent eligibility appeals currently 
pending before the Court. Currently pending opportunities for the Supreme Court 
to grant certiorari include in Berkheimer, Vanda, and Athena Diagnostics. It 
remains to be seen; it is interesting that this time, unlike in Ariosa, the Supreme 
Court has indeed invited the Solicitor General to submit a brief in both Berkheimer 
and in Vanda; for Athena Diagnostics, a petition for certiorari is expected to be 
filed within weeks. 
 173 Robert Schwartz & Timo Minssen, Life After Myriad: The Uncertain Future 
of Patenting Biomedical Innovation and Personalised Medicine in an 
International Context, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 189–241 (2015). 
 174 Christopher M. Holman, Mayo, Myriad, and the Future of Innovation in 
Molecular Diagnostics and Personalized Medicine, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 639 
(2014). 
 175 INTELL. PROP. OWNERS ASS’N., PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO PATENT 
ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2017), 
http://www.ipo.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/20170207_IPO-101-TF-
Proposed-Amendments-and-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4MW-G24Z] (stating 
that recent decisions “have dramatically narrowed the scope of patent protection 
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One year after its Myriad decision, came Alice.176 In Alice, the 
Supreme Court considered the patentability of a computer-
implemented financial trading exchange system.177 Here, the 
Supreme Court underlined its two-part test for identifying patent 
ineligible subject matter.178 First, a claim is analyzed to see if any of 
the exceptions to the statute apply.179 If so, then the patent claim is 
reviewed to determine whether the claim recites additional elements 
that transform the claim into a patent-eligible application of any of 
those three exceptions to the statute.180 In this second step of the test, 
it is necessary to determine whether the claim incorporates an 
“inventive concept” that amounts to more than merely applying the 
law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea to a particular 
technological environment.181 The Court determined that the method 
claims in Alice were drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated 
settlement, and that this amounted to nothing more than 
implementation of an abstract idea on a computer.182 
Alice thus confirms that Mayo’s test should be used to determine 
patent eligibility questions under Section 101, namely that it is not 
whether a patent claim has a practical application, but rather 
whether it has an inventive application of an underlying principle.183 
The Alice decision underscored the Court’s concern with 
preemption, recognizing that abstract ideas are not patentable 
because granting a monopoly to an abstract idea would stifle 
innovation.184 Thus, a claim that recites an abstract idea must include 
“additional features” that amount to an “inventive concept” to be 
 
for life sciences and software technology by significantly expanding the 
judicially-created exceptions to patent-eligible subject matter”). 
 176 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
 177 Id. at 208. 
 178 Id. at 217–18. 
 179 Id. at 218. 
 180 Id. at 221. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 225. 
 183 Id. at 222. 
 184 Id. at 216. 
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patent eligible subject matter.185 Alice also confirms that Mayo’s 
two-step analysis should be applied to all types of claims.186 
In Mayo187 and Alice,188 the Supreme Court thus adopted a two-
step test for determining patent-eligibility under Section 101, giving 
rise to the expansion of the Supreme Court created exceptions to 
what is patent eligible subject matter. These exceptions are 
exceptions to the four categories of subject matter explicitly listed 
in the Section 101 statute as being patent eligible.189 That is, even if 
an invention falls within one of the four categories of patent eligible 
subject matter under the statute, it can still be found to be ineligible 
subject matter because of the Supreme Court-created exceptions to 
this statutory language. Under this new Mayo/Alice two step test, 
one begins with determining whether the claimed invention is to one 
of the four statutory categories.190 If not, to qualify for patent eligible 
subject matter, the patent claim must not be directed to a judicial 
exception unless the claim as a whole includes additional limitations 
amounting to significantly more than the exception.191 
This new Mayo/Alice test has been very difficult for patent 
stakeholders, including examiners, inventors, patent owners, patent 
lawyers and judges alike, to implement and/or interpret because it 
remains unclear what the boundaries of Section 101 are.192 As the IP 
 
 185 Id. at 221. 
 186 Id. at 216. 
 187 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
 188 Alice, 573 U.S. at 208. 
 189 The current version of the patent eligibility statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018), 
states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements 
of this title.” 
 190 Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18; see Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77; see also 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (2018). 
 191 See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72. 
 192 See Synchronoss Techs., Inc. v. Dropbox Inc., No. 16-cv-00119-HSG (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 22, 2016) (“This Court agrees with those judges who have observed that 
even post-Enfish, the Mayo/Alice test provides limited practical guidance for 
distinguishing software and computer patents that are valid under § 101 from 
those that are not.”); Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 
(Fed.Cir. 2016) (“[A] search for a single test or definition [of what an ‘abstract 
idea’ encompasses] in the decided cases concerning § 101 from this court, and 
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Law Section Chair of the American Bar Association conservatively 
put it recently “the Supreme Court has injected ambiguity into the 
subject matter eligibility determination.”193 The President of the 
American IP Law Association agreed with that sentiment in his own 
letter to the government on behalf of his law association.194 The 
patent bar and the USPTO remain lost on how to implement this new 
patent eligibility test, even five years after the Supreme Court 
decided Alice.195 Interestingly, even the Supreme Court itself seems 
lost in how to apply the test, as evidenced by the major 
inconsistencies between its patent eligibility decisions.196 Scholars 
also noticed that the Court provided minimal guidance regarding the 
boundaries of its new test.197 
 
indeed from the Supreme Court, reveals that at present there is no such single, 
succinct, usable definition or test.”); Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 
838 F.3d 1307, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Mayer, J., concurring) (describing the 
“semantic gymnastics” entailed in applying the Mayo/Alice test); BASCOM Glob. 
Internet Servs. V. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1352–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(Newman, J., concurring) (“I have come upon no guide to when a claim crosses 
the boundary between unacceptable abstractness and acceptable specificity.”); 
Device Enhancement LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 3d 392 (D. Del. 
2016) (discussing the “still difficult-to-discern requirements of the Alice 
analysis,” and the resulting “difficult exercise” under § 101). 
 193 Letter from Donna P. Suchy, Section Chair, Section of Intell. Prop. Law, 
Am. Bar Ass’n., to Michelle K. Lee, Under Sec’y of Com. for Intell. Prop. and 
Dir. of the USPTO (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/administrative/intellectual_property_law/advocacy/advocacy-
20170117-comments.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/99CM-KVSQ] (stating 
“the Supreme Court has injected ambiguity into the subject-matter eligibility 
determination”). 
 194 Letter from Mark L. Whitaker, President, Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass’n., to 
Michelle K. Lee, Under Sec’y of Com. for Intell. Prop. and Dir. of the USPTO 
(Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
comments_aipla_jan182017.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2EE-2UJ5] (outlining how 
the Supreme Court’s recent patent eligibility decisions have caused “uncertainty 
and inefficiency for patent applicants and litigants[.]”). 
 195 Id.; see generally Tran & Benevento, supra note 15. 
 196 Donald R. Dunner, The Supreme Court: A Help or a Hindrance to the 
Federal Circuit’s Mission?, 17 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 298 (2018). 
See Donald R. Dunner, Response to Judge Timothy B. Dyke, 16 CHI.-KENT J. 
INTELL. PROP. 326 (2017); see also Golden, supra note 12, at 1770. 
 197 Christopher M. Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad: A Reinvigorated 
Judicial Wildcard of Uncertain Effect, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1796, 1798 (2014) 
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Prior to reaching the Supreme Court, there was a highly divided 
en banc decision at the Federal Circuit in Alice.198 The Chief Judge 
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) at the time, 
Judge Rader, referred to the CAFC’s inability to render a majority 
opinion in Alice as “the biggest failure of his career.”199 In his view, 
interpretation of Section 101 was simply settled law, based on Diehr 
and Chakrabarty. Another former Chief Judge of the CAFC, Judge 
Michel, predicted that Alice’s new test for patent eligibility would 
“create total chaos,” stating that the test is “too vague, too 
subjective, too unpredictable and impossible to administer in a 
coherent, consistent way in the patent office or in the district courts 
or even in the federal circuit.”200 
Further still, Judge Moore’s dissent in Alice, in which she was 
joined by three other Federal Circuit judges, took a negative view of 
reading judicial exceptions expansively.201 As yet another indication 
of how split the Federal Circuit was when it decided Alice, Judge 
Newman stated in her own dissent that the court should return to the 
express statutory language of Section 101 and Congress’s intent.202 
 
(“Unfortunately, the Court has provided little guidance with respect to the 
readjusted contours of the newly invigorated doctrine, and as a consequence, 
judges and the PTO have been thrown into a state of confusion with respect to the 
proper application of the doctrine; the high degree of uncertainty is even more 
problematic for patent attorneys and their clients.”). 
 198 CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 199 Dan Levine, Insight: Rocker Judge Juggles Tech Policy, Supreme Court and 
the Stones, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2013) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
judge-rader-insight/insight-rocker-judge-juggles-tech-policy-supreme-court-and-
the-stones-idUSBRE9BA06D20131211 [https://perma.cc/4HVG-GD9K]. 
 200 See Quinn, supra note 25. 
 201 In her dissent in Alice, Judge Moore stated: “I am concerned that [in] the 
current interpretation of § 101 . . . The Supreme Court has taken a number of our 
recent decisions and, in each instance, concluded that the claims at issue were not 
patent-eligible. See Bilski, Prometheus, Myriad (under consideration) . . . holding 
that [all claims] are all patent-ineligible under § 101 . . . Holding that all of these 
claims are directed to no more than an abstract idea gives staggering breadth to 
what is meant to be a narrow judicial exception.” Alice, 717 F.3d at 1313 (Moore, 
J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 202 Judge Newman also wrote separately in Alice: “I propose that the court 
return to the statute, and hold that when the subject matter is within the statutory 
classes in section 101, eligibility is established. This conforms with legislative 
intent.” Alice Corp., 717 F.3d at 1326 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
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The discontent among Federal Circuit judges vis-à-vis the new 
patent eligibility test continues, and it is clear from the past year that 
the judges are unhappy with the status quo. For example, in 
Berkheimer v HP Inc., Judge Lourie concurred, noting that “the law 
needs clarification by higher authority, perhaps by Congress, to 
work its way out of what so many in the innovation field consider 
are Section 101 problems.”203 In another patent eligibility decision 
from last year, Judge Plager criticized the process of finding abstract 
ideas as an elusive search for inventiveness, and asked “[i]s it any 
wonder that the results of this process are less than satisfactory.”204 
That said, the Federal Circuit has tried to find a way to dampen 
the toxic effect of recent Supreme Court decisions on patent 
eligibility on key industries such as medical diagnostics and 
software-driven bioinformatics. The Circuit provided guidance on 
step one of Alice in Enfish,205 stating that “focus[ing] on a specific 
means or method that improves the relevant technology” is patent 
eligible to validate protection for technologies in the software 
industry,206 and also provided some guidance on step two of Alice in 
 
in part). See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (“In 
choosing such expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ 
modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the 
patent laws would be given wide scope.”). 
 203 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (per 
curiam) (Lourie, J., concurring) (stating that § 101 “needs clarification by higher 
authority, perhaps by Congress” and opining that “the Supreme Court whittled 
away at the § 101 statute in Mayo by analyzing abstract ideas and natural 
phenomena with a two-step test . . . thereby bringing aspects of §§ 102 and 103 
into the eligibility analysis”), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-415 (U.S. Oct. 3, 
2018). 
 204 Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 
2018). 
 205 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp, 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The case 
stands for the proposition that software inventions may be patent-eligible, if the 
innovation does not pertain to an abstract idea for which a computer is used 
“merely as a tool.” This decision bucks the trend of invalidating software patents 
as mere abstract ideas based on Alice. 
 206 See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 
(Fed. Cir. 2016); Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 
2017); Visual Memory LLC v. Nvidia Corp., 867 F.3d 1253 (Fed Cir. 2017). 
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Bascom.207 Yet, although a few cases have survived the patent 
eligibility challenge, many more such patents have been invalidated 
under this new patent eligibility test.208 
Thus, the main problem with expanding the scope of the 
exceptions to patent eligibility is that inventions/discoveries in 
biotechnology, and in particular medical diagnostics technologies, 
tend to be intertwined with what occurs in nature. As described 
above, this sector has been hit hard by the change in patent eligibility 
laws with the Federal Circuit invalidating medical diagnostic claims 
at an alarmingly high rate. For example, patent claims to methods 
for determining a patient’s risk of developing cardiovascular disease 
by detecting the myeloperoxidase enzyme in the patients’ blood and 
making a correlation from the results to cardiovascular risk was 
found to be patent ineligible subject matter.209 Interestingly, in this 
recent Cleveland Clinic decision,210 the Federal Circuit aligned itself 
with its problematic earlier ruling in Ariosa,211 concluding that claim 
limitations directed to standard techniques will fail to pass the 
Section 101 patent eligibility hurdle.212 Five years on from Alice, 
there are now many opinions by Federal Circuit judges expressing 
 
 207 Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 
(Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 208 See, e.g., Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 
909 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2000 (2018); Aatrix Software, Inc. 
v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018); In re Marco 
Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Roche Molecular Sys., 
Inc. v. CEPHEID, 905 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018); BSG Tech. LLC v. 
Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Interval Licensing LLC v. 
AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 209 Clev. Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics, 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 
2017). 
 210 Id. 
 211 Discussed further infra Part VI. 
 212 Clev. Clinic, 859 F.3d at 1360 (noting that “each limitation Cleveland Clinic 
raises, however, merely recites known methods of detecting MPO or MPO 
derivatives and applies the correlation between these biomarkers and 
cardiovascular health”); id. at 1361 (“Indeed, Cleveland Clinic has not created a 
new laboratory technique; rather, it uses well-known techniques to execute the 
claimed method.”). 
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frustration by their inability to avoid the handcuffs of the Supreme 
Court’s Section 101 jurisprudence.213 
Thus, the new patent eligibility test under Mayo/Alice is badly 
suited for medical diagnostic tests that rely on newly discovered 
laws of nature. The patent bar and all stakeholders in the technology 
industry, especially in the medical diagnostics industry, are in dire 
need of a clear test to use for determining whether a diagnostic test 
that has its basis in a law of nature is patent eligible. There are 
options for greatly improving the current status quo.214 
C. Disarray in Biomedical Industry Caused by the Supreme 
Court’s New “Inventive Application” Standard for 
Determining Patent Eligibility and the Misclassification of 
Innovations in Medical Diagnostics as Laws of Nature or 
Products of Nature 
As defined in Section 101, the four categories of patent eligible 
subject matter are: processes, machines, manufactures and 
compositions of matter,215 with the first category defining “actions” 
and the latter three categories defining “things.”216 The Supreme 
Court created exceptions to these four statutory categories, finding 
laws of nature, natural products of nature, and abstract ideas to be 
patent ineligible subject matter.217 In the Court’s view, inventions 
that encompass these exceptions are “basic tools of scientific and 
technological work”218 that should be “free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none,”219 and that this “reflects a basic judgment that 
 
 213 Id.; see Dunner, The Supreme Court, supra note 196. 
 214 See discussion infra Part VI.c. 
 215 For more detailed information on the four categories, see Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedure § 2106.03. 
 216 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 100(b), “The term ‘process’ means process, art, or 
method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, 
composition of matter, or material.” See also 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2018); Corning 
v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1854); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 
308 (1980). 
 217 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013); 
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
 218 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 219 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
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protection in such cases, despite its potentially positive incentive 
effects, would too often severely interfere with, or discourage, 
development and the further spread of useful knowledge itself.”220 
For example, under this principle, Einstein may have discovered that 
anything having mass has an equivalent amount of energy, but he 
would not have been able to patent his celebrated formula, E=mc2, 
that shows this relationship, nor could Newton patent his discovery 
of the law of gravity, or a lay person patent his/her discovery of a 
new mineral in the earth. These kinds of discoveries are 
“manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.”221 
The problem with Mayo expanding the boundaries of the law of 
nature exception to patent eligible subject matter is that it fails to 
recognize that the very nature of molecular medical diagnostics 
means that new discoveries in this field, more so than other fields, 
are meshed with what occurs in nature. Whereas until now, most 
medical treatments have taken the “average patient” into account, 
personalized medicine using innovative medical diagnostics 
technologies allows for a different approach and this includes 
ultimately measuring how each patient’s body works and drawing 
clinical conclusions. Thus, the very nature of these types of medical 
diagnostic technologies easily trigger the exceptions expounded by 
the Mayo trilogy.222 Hence, unsurprisingly, the Mayo decision 
resulted in a dramatic increase in rejections of patent applications 
related to genetics and personalized medicine.223 Moreover, in the 
courts, the Federal Circuit rejected patent claims based on patent 
ineligibility at an eye-popping rate of 94.1 percent in 2015 and 92.3 
 
 220 Lab. Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 548 U.S. 
124, 128 (2006). 
 221 Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130. 
 222 Referring to the three back-to-back Supreme Court cases: Mayo, Myriad and 
Alice. 
 223 Bernard Chao and Amy Mapes, An Early Look at Mayo’s Impact on 
Personalized Medicine, 2016 PATENTLY-O PAT. L. J. 10. It should be noted that 
this study did not include any analysis of the ultimate outcome of these rejections 
in order to see if any rejections are withdrawn in view of attorney arguments, 
something that would be important in assessing the ultimate practical effects of 
the Supreme Court’s recent patent-eligibility decisions. 
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percent in 2016,224 with the number of Federal Circuit Section 101 
opinions rising from just 19 in the five years before Alice to 156 in 
the five years after Alice, an increase of 732 percent.225 
One recent case that demonstrates how difficult the lower courts 
are finding Mayo’s implementation is Vanda.226 In Vanda, the 
Federal Circuit decided that the “method of treatment” patent claims 
were not directed to a judicial exception and thus were patent 
eligible subject matter, even though the claims appeared very similar 
to the method of treatment claims at issue in Mayo. In Vanda, the 
patent was directed to a medical diagnostic technology related to 
treating schizophrenic patients with iloperidone.227 The treatment 
method involved first genotyping the patient to assess a gene called 
CYP2D6, and then based on that assessment and extrapolation 
concerning the schizophrenic patient’s metabolism, giving the 
patient a low dose of iloperidone so as to decrease cardiovascular 
side-effects if the genotyping step indicated it necessary.228 Here, the 
Federal Circuit in effect circumvented Mayo by sidestepping the 
first step of the test, even though the “inventive concept” in Vanda 
was ultimately, like in Mayo, a natural law. 
Although the Federal Circuit was split in Vanda, the majority 
decision tried to take the edge off of the destructive effect of Mayo 
on the medical diagnostic industry by looking to find a way to parse 
Vanda to be distinct from Mayo when not enough room existed 
between the underlying medical diagnostic technologies to make 
that distinction. As such, what we are left with is the uninspiring 
position of having to draft patent claims to mirror the seemingly 
patent eligible method of treatment steps in Vanda. That specter 
leaves us with a position, for example, of having to just cosmetically 
reword diagnostic method patent claims to recite a treatment based 
 
 224 Jasper L. Tran, Two Years After Alice v. CLS Bank, 98 J. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 354, 358–59 (2016); see also Tran & Benevento, supra 
note 15. 
 225 See Sachs, supra note 19. 
 226 Vanda Pharms. Inc. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117, 1133 
(Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 227 Id. at 1121. 
 228 Id. 
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on the diagnosis, such that the claim only “touches upon” a law of 
nature but is directed to a particular method of treatment.229 
Indeed, at least presently, the best chance of success on such 
medical diagnostic method claims appears to be one in which 
practitioners draft claims to recite an application of a natural law 
specifically enough, such that the claim does not have to satisfy the 
“significantly more” hurdle of the test in Mayo.230 To draw on the 
parallel abstract idea exception where claims are eligible if they 
“recite a specific improvement over prior systems”231 or enable a 
computer or device “to do things it could not do before,”232 patent 
claims related to an overarching natural law, as medical diagnostic 
claims commonly are, can sidestep the Alice and Mayo scrutiny by 
including language in the claims to particular applications, for 
example by including a treatment step of the natural law. 
Most recently, in another medical diagnostic technology case, 
the Federal Circuit upheld the eligibility of a claim involving an 
assessment of a patient’s metabolic characteristics before a dosing 
regimen is given to the patient.233 In Endo Pharma, the Federal 
Circuit deemed the claims to be “legally indistinguishable” from 
those in Vanda.234 Both Vanda and Endo Pharma recite method of 
treatment claims to “steps of carrying out a dosage regimen based 
on the results of . . . testing,” and both “require specific treatment 
steps.” In both these recent biotechnology decisions, the Federal 
Circuit points out that the inventors in both Vanda and Endo Pharma 
identified a natural law and claimed an application of the 
relationship they identified, not the natural law itself,235 and as such 
both claims were “directed to more than just reciting the natural 
 
 229 Id. at 1136 (“At bottom, the claims here are directed to a specific method of 
treatment for specific patients using a specific compound at specific doses to 
achieve a specific outcome. They are different from Mayo.”). 
 230 Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 231 Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356, 1363 
(Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 232 Finjan, Inc., v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 233 Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 919 F.3d 
1347, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 234 Id. (citing Vanda Pharm. v. West-Ward Pharm. Int’l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117 
(Fed. Cir. 2018)). 
 235 Id. at 1353–54 (citing Vanda, 887 F.3d at 1135). 
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relationship.”236 Indeed, the Federal Circuit distinguished these 
cases from Mayo by highlighting that the patent claims in Mayo “as 
a whole [were] not directed to the application of a drug to treat a 
particular disease.”237 As discussed above, although these may be 
seen as Mayo working, the vast majority of stakeholders in the 
biotechnology industry see Mayo as being destructive and hard to 
implement and work with. 
Mayo requires a determination of what is routine conventional 
activity and what would be “significantly more” and “inventive.”238 
These are all subjective determinations and certainly not one that a 
person not having ordinary skill in the art should be making. For 
one, all other key sections of the Patent Act dealing with 
determining what is new, obvious and whether an invention has 
been described in sufficient detail, make these key patentability 
determinations based on the skill level of an ordinary artisan in that 
field.239 In the current initial threshold finding of what subject matter 
is even eligible for a patent, the view of the ordinary skilled artisan 
is excluded. That is, another problem with the new patent eligibility 
test is not only the subjectivity of having to determine what is an 
“inventive concept” in a given technology (traditionally the 
exclusive domain of Section 102), and what amounts to 
“significantly more,” is “routine and conventional,” and what 
“sufficiently transforms,”240 but that all of this is taking shape 
without the necessity of having the views of a person of ordinary 
skill in the art take central role. 
The test in Mayo is too subjective. It disregards the efforts of 
skilled innovators and instead allows someone, typically an 
examiner or judge with no skill in the art, to determine what is 
 
 236 Id. The Court found the combination of the “administering step” and the 
“wherein clause” “identified the appropriate schedule and dose . . . to administer,” 
so the claims did “more than just recognize the need to lower or decrease a dose.” 
Id. at 1355. 
 237 Id. (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 
66, 74 (2012)). 
 238 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73. 
 239 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2018). 
 240 All concepts that are required under the new patent eligibility test under 
Mayo and Alice. 
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“inventive,” “significantly more” and “conventional” in a given 
field of art.241 A court determines who the person of ordinary skill in 
the art is, using relevant factors,242 however, the patent eligibility 
determination should involve the person having ordinary skill and 
not be left to the courts. In the field of medical diagnostic 
technologies, that ordinary skilled person is typically a doctor who 
either developed the test as a researcher or one who applies the test 
in a medical clinical setting, not individuals who have less than 
ordinary training in that medical diagnostic technology. 
What makes the new patent eligibility test all the more terse is 
that such subjective determinations on patent eligibility are 
threshold determinations, meaning the invention is not even looked 
at for true inventiveness or obviousness under the more established 
objective tests of different parts of the Patent Act, if it is deemed as 
a preliminary matter to be ineligible under section 101.243 
Furthermore, as discussed above, these determinations have 
invalidated patents at the early stages of patent litigation, before any 
substantive deliberations on whether the invention is new or 
obvious. 
Setting aside Mayo would be a step in the right direction by 
restoring the Supreme Court’s older Diehr legal framework. Indeed, 
if the Supreme Court had taken its own approach in Chakrabarty 
and Diehr and asked in its deliberations in Mayo and Myriad 
whether a claimed invention (considered as a whole and taking into 
account the contribution of all elements) is found in nature, it would 
have arrived at a different conclusion regarding these medical 
diagnostic technologies being essentially a feature of nature. One 
can only surmise why the Supreme Court decided to follow its much 
older Flook and Funk Bros. approach than its own recent reasoning 
in Chakrabarty and Diehr and the reliance in industry on these more 
recent decisions. However, all is not lost as there are legislative 
options to correct this error. 
 
 241 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73. 
 242 Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
 243 See discussion infra Part VI.c. 
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D. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Parallel Law on Patent Eligibility is 
Inconsistent with Express Statutory Language, and Runs 
Against the U.S. Constitution 
In situations where the U.S. Constitution has given sole 
authority to Congress to create laws consistent with that granted 
authority, the judicial branch’s highest court, namely the U.S. 
Supreme Court, is then limited to that statutory construction.244 In 
this context, when the Supreme Court accepts to address a question 
of patent law related to patent eligible subject matter, the Supreme 
Court is required to construe the literal meaning of Section 101. 
However, the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence, discussed 
supra, has departed from the literal meaning of the statue, instead 
introducing its own law in the area of patent eligibility by creating 
broad exceptions to the statute. In so doing, it has become clear to 
many stakeholders that the Court has conflated, whether 
intentionally or not, other existing statutory regimes concerning 
patentability with the threshold issue of patent eligibility.245 For 
example, the new law for determining patent eligibility requires an 
“inventive application” which is traditionally a concept dealt with 
under the novelty provisions in Section 102 of the Patent Act.246 
Congress has been consistent with their intent concerning patent 
eligible subject matter. Indeed, based on the legislative history of 
Section 101, discussed above, and the fact that multiple Patent Acts 
passed by Congress over a period of some 200 years, including the 
 
 244 Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). Indeed, 
the Supreme Court in Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 
N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) has stated that “when the statute’s language is plain, 
the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text 
is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” (citation omitted). The 
Supreme Court further states in Connecticut Nat’l Bank, 503 U.S. at 253–54 that 
“courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means 
in a statute what it says . . . “ and going even further in its Connecticut Nat’l Bank 
decision to be clear that “when the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this 
first canon is also the last . . . judicial inquiry is complete.” (citation omitted). 
 245 Paxton M. Lewis, The Conflation of Patent Eligibility and Obviousness: 
Alice’s Substitution of Section 103, 1 UTAH ONLAW: UTAH L. REV. ONLINE SUPP. 
13 (2017). 
 246 See e.g. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 
2016). 
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recently passed America Invents Act, have kept the concise 
language of Section 101 largely unchanged, it is clear that no 
exceptions were contemplated or intended. In particular, even where 
Congress recently passed the America Invents Act,247 the biggest 
fundamental change in patent law in sixty years, major changes were 
made to the law on patentability while those on patent eligibility 
were left largely untouched.248 
These judicially created exceptions represent a direct afront to 
the statute and run contrary to Congress’s express and implicit 
intent, as well as their constitutionally mandated task of 
“Promot[ing] the useful arts.”249 Moreover, the statute clearly states, 
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture or composition of matter . . . may obtain a 
patent . . . .”250 Thus, the Supreme Court’s fascination with 
“inventive concept” fails to consider the word “discovers” in the 
statute. Not only should there be no exceptions to the four statutory 
categories of patent eligible subject matter as adumbrated in the 
Section 101 statute,251 but that any “invention or discovery” related 
to these four listed categories should suffice to pass this intentionally 
low threshold finding of whether a subject matter is deemed patent 
eligible. The Supreme Court fails to acknowledge or discuss, and 
indeed omits, any focus on the word “discovers” in their patent 
eligibility jurisprudence. This can reasonably be deduced to be 
because it does not fit the Supreme Court’s test, and yet there is a 
reason that the statute includes this word. If anything, there is 
nothing to indicate that the word “discovers” ought to have anything 
less than equal weight to the word “invents” when the statute 
expressly recites “invents or discovers.” And yet, the Supreme 
Court recently in Myriad boldly undermined this, stating 
 
 247 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 248 The current version of the patent eligibility statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018), 
states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements 
of this title.” 
 249 U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8. 
 250 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (emphasis added). 
 251 Id. 
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“groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by 
itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”252 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has itself stated in Chakrabarty,253 
“Congress has intended patentable subject matter to include 
anything under the sun that is made by man.”254 The Court further 
explained Section 101 eligibility and its scope by stating that “[w]e 
have cautioned that courts should not read into the patent laws 
limitations and conditions which the legislature has not 
expressed.”255 In choosing such expansive terms as the four listed 
statutory patent eligible subject matters modified by the 
comprehensive “any”, “Congress plainly contemplated that the 
patent laws would be given wide scope.”256 No exceptions were 
contemplated, so long as any invention or discovery falls within the 
four categories of patent eligible subject matter that have been listed 
in the statute for over two hundred years. Contrary to the Supreme 
Court’s recent interpretation, it is clear from both the express 
language of the statute and its legislative history, discussed supra, 
that patent eligible subject matter, under the Section 101 statute, 
should be given wide scope. 
The Supreme Court’s recent trilogy of cases on patent eligibility 
runs counter to the plain meaning of Section 101 and its legislative 
intent,257 and is inconsistent with past Supreme Court precedent.258 
Tellingly, these past decisions provide very little analysis of 
statutory construction or legislative intent.259 Instead, seemingly out 
of thin air, the Supreme Court created, and recently greatly 
expanded the scope of, the “judicial exceptions” to the federal 
statute that outlines the requirements to patent eligibility. This 
contrarian jurisprudence by the Supreme Court has caused disarray 
 
 252 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 577 
(2013) (emphasis added). 
 253 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
 254 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 642 (2010) (noting Congress’s intention for 
statutory subject matter to “include anything under the sun that is made by man”) 
(quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309) (citation omitted). 
 255 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp, 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933). 
 256 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (emphasis added). 
 257 See discussion supra Part II. 
 258 Golden, supra note 12, at 1770. 
 259 Holman, supra note 197, at 1798. 
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in technology-driven industries, harming especially innovation in 
biotechnology and medical diagnostics fields in the United States. 
V. INHIBITION OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATION CAUSED BY EXISTING PATENT 
ELIGIBILITY LAWS 
The U.S. Constitution requires Congress to promote 
innovation.260 Developing innovative new biotechnological products 
takes much time and money; and depends on robust and predictable 
patent protection, as an inducer for those who wish to take risks and 
develop new innovative technologies. In the biotechnology, drugs, 
and medical diagnostics field, the process for developing a new 
disease therapy begins with basic research done to elucidate the 
underpinnings of a disease, find potential targets and diagnostic 
methods to detect various stages of the disease and ways to manage 
it.261 The developmental process can take many years and cost 
between $2 and $3 billion.262 Thus, any radical changes in patent 
laws that disrupt this enticement of a reward for companies, can 
greatly affect innovation by technology-driven companies. Sadly, 
the radical change in patent eligibility laws has greatly affected the 
medical diagnostics and personalized medicine industries. 
In a recent elegant study researchers examined U.S. patent 
applications that received patent ineligibility rejections.263 The study 
then compared that same technology to see if it was also rejected as 
patent ineligible subject matter in Europe or in China.264 In their 
 
 260 U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8 recites “promote the progress of science and 
the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
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empirical analysis, the authors questioned whether the impact of the 
newly adopted patent eligibility laws are resulting in the U.S. 
surrendering its long-held position as the world leader in new 
technology development and commercialization.265 The results 
should speak volumes to law and policy makers: over 1,700 U.S. 
patent applications spanning multiple technologies, including 
everything from drugs and therapeutics, molecular biology, 
combinatorial chemistry databases, immunology, microbiology, 
telecommunications, artificial intelligence, to name a few, were all 
found to be ineligible subject matter for patenting in the U.S. 
because of the recently expansive Supreme Court patent ineligibility 
regime. And yet, those very same technologies were all found to be 
patent eligible subject matter in both the European Union and in 
China.266 
In yet another recent study, 4.4 million office actions mailed 
from 2008 through mid-July 2017 covering 2.2 million unique 
patent applications were studied using a novel technology 
identification strategy.267 The results showed a spike in patent 
eligibility rejections, especially in the medical diagnostics and 
software patent applications following the Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions in Alice and Mayo.268 Interestingly, although this study did 
not find a major impact on other fields, it did find that among the 
patent applications directed to medical diagnostic technologies, the 
patent eligibility rejection rate grew from 7 percent to 32 percent in 
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the month after Mayo and continued to climb to a high of 64 percent 
and to 78 percent among final office actions just prior to 
abandonment.269 
Moreover, many patent stakeholders have recognized this 
negative effect of current patent eligibility jurisprudence, especially 
on the medical diagnostics and personalized medicine field. For 
example, Senator Coons recently commented that “[t]oday, U.S. 
patent law discourages innovation in some of the most critical areas 
of technology, including artificial intelligence, medical diagnostics, 
and personalized medicine.”270 To give further context to this 
statement, a diagnosis of a disease generally occurs before 
treatments and cures can be developed. As such, new medical 
diagnostic tests typically precede the invention of new innovative 
medical devices, with the latter typically trailing discovery of new 
diagnostic tests by about a decade.271 
It follows that as a result of the negative impact the new patent 
eligibility laws have on the medical diagnostics industry, far fewer 
medical devices will be developed in the decade to come. This is yet 
another unintended consequence of the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of Section 101, especially as it relates to the 
development of newly emerging medical diagnostic technologies 
and follow-on development of new medical devices. Moreover, as 
other commentators have pointed out, the recently promulgated 
legal test for patent eligible subject matter in the U.S. is so opaque 
as to create substantial doubt on the longevity of long-term research 
and development and the growth of technological innovation in 
general, including innovation in the medical diagnostics 
technologies.272 
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A. Profound Uncertainty Precipitated by the Supreme Court’s 
New Patent Eligibility Jurisprudence Has Caused a Downturn 
in the Biotechnology Industry 
Some have highlighted that because of the recent changes in 
patent eligibility laws “many inventions are improperly being 
denied protection and there is significant uncertainty among 
patentees and patent applicants as to the breadth of the judicially 
created exclusions from patent eligibility.”273 Biomedical innovation 
and in particular medical diagnostics technologies appear to be 
severely affected, with one Federal Circuit judge commenting that 
“it is also said that a crisis of patent law and medical innovation may 
be upon us, and there seems to be some truth in that concern.”274 
Moreover, according to the Biotechnology Industries Organization 
and the Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America, this 
trend presents a “dark cloud overshadowing thousands of issued and 
maintained biotechnology patents,” which “affects future 
investment decisions.”275 Indeed, research has shown that “the 
courts invalidated more patents in the 14 months since Alice, than 
they did in the five years previous to Alice.”276 This fundamental 
change in patent eligibility laws has resulted in a disproportionate 
impact on certain fields, including in medical diagnostic and 
biotechnology industries.277 
Moreover, a recent study focused on the fundamental question 
of whether the Supreme Court’s new patent eligibility legal 
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framework actually impacted decisions to invest in new technology 
development and commercialization.278 A survey of 475 venture 
capital and private equity investors studied the impact of the Court’s 
patent eligibility cases on their firms’ decisions to invest in 
companies developing technology.279 This study found that investors 
overwhelmingly believe patent eligibility is an important 
consideration when their firms decide whether to invest in 
companies developing technology. These results are in tune with the 
notion that patents are an absolutely integral part of capital 
investment decisions being made to develop newly emerging 
innovative technologies, including those in the biotechnology and 
medical diagnostic field. Interestingly, investors view patent 
eligibility as affecting different industries to different levels and 
factor this into their capital investment decisions. For example, 
whereas capital investment in construction related technologies is 
only minimally affected by the new patent eligibility laws, the new 
legal landscape is having a huge impact for these same venture 
capital and private equity firms when they view a potential 
investment opportunity in biotechnology and medical diagnostics 
industries.280 
The investors have been turning away from investing in certain 
innovation-focused industries, such as biotechnology and software-
driven innovations, as a direct result of the Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions on this issue. In particular, about 200 venture capital and 
private equity investors indicated that the Supreme Court’s recent 
patent eligibility laws had a somewhat negative or very negative 
effects on their firm’s existing investments.281 33 percent of 
investors who focus on technologies reported that the new patent 
eligibility laws impacted their firms’ investment behavior, with 
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these investors reporting that they shifted their capital investments 
away from companies that were developing new technology related 
to biotechnology, medical diagnostics and pharmaceutical 
industries.282 This 2019 report adds to the data emerging regarding 
how the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on patent eligibility are 
harming the medical diagnostics industry and innovation economy 
in the U.S. 
Similar statements made by no less than the current acting 
Director of the USPTO that the Mayo/Myriad/Alice test is damaging 
technological innovation and economic competitiveness by giving 
stakeholders very significant reason to pause when looking to take 
risks to develop new emerging technologies because of the 
Mayo/Myriad/Alice framework making for a weak patent protection 
landscape. Indeed, this data supports recent study by other scholars 
who highlighted for the first time empirical data to support the fears 
of many stakeholders that the Supreme Court’s recent patent 
eligibility decisions have set forth a dark future for the U.S. 
innovation economy, especially as it relates to newly emerging 
innovative medical diagnostic technologies. Those same 
technologies that are being routinely rejected in the U.S. as being 
patent ineligible subject matter are being found to be patent eligible 
subject matter under the laws in Europe, Australia, and China.283 
Since the Alice decision, it has become much harder to obtain 
patents in certain industries, especially in the medical diagnostics 
and software industries. Unfortunately, this has stymied the 
development of specialized software related to medical diagnostics, 
such as artificial intelligence (AI) for better deciding and diagnosing 
disease based on rapid readings and extrapolations of large data sets. 
The practical results of which have been that innovation goes where 
it has the best chance to grow. For example, it should be a warning 
to our law and policy makers that Chinese AI start-ups are now 
receiving more funding than American AI start-ups. According to a 
review published in 2018 by MIT Technology Review, of the $15.2 
billion invested in AI startups globally in 2017, 48 percent went to 
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China and just 38 percent to America.284 The U.S. is starting to lose 
out in capital investments in key industries, such as artificial 
intelligence which has interconnections to newly emerging medical 
diagnostic technologies, highlighted by the fact that while the U.S. 
accounted for 77 percent of such investment before the Alice 
decision, that investment fell to 50 percent three years after the Alice 
decision.285 
A study published in 2019 that surveyed close to 500 venture 
capital and private equity firms about how their investment 
decisions in new technologies changed since the new Supreme 
Court created patent eligibility laws came into effect, provided 
critical data for an evidence-based evaluation of how the havoc 
caused by the Supreme Court has affected investments in new 
technology development.286 Professor Taylor makes a compelling 
evidence-based argument, highlighting the negative impact of the 
Supreme Court’s recent patent eligibility cases, namely 
Mayo/Myriad/Alice, has had on capital investment, and especially 
so on investment decisions being made on emerging innovative new 
technologies in the biotechnology, medical diagnostics and 
pharmaceutical industries. The study points out that these medicine 
related technologies, even though they are the most impactful in 
terms of public health, are the most impacted by reduced 
investments in these industries directly because of the Supreme 
Court’s recent decisions on patent eligibility.287 
These findings further support the position that Congress should 
act to overturn the Supreme Court’s new eligibility standard to 
prevent additional lost investment in technological development in 
the United States. Indeed, given the results of at least the above two 
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comprehensive recent surveys,288 it seems likely that the Supreme 
Court’s eligibility decisions have resulted in lost investment in the 
biotechnology and medical diagnostics fields and that this has 
delayed or altogether prevented the development of new medicines 
and diagnostics tests. This coupled with China taking market share 
from the U.S. in emerging new technologies ought to spur 
lawmakers to turn their attention to this pressing issue. 
VI. TO ENCOURAGE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND 
THE USEFUL ARTS, CONGRESS SHOULD REVISIT 
PATENT ELIGIBILITY LAWS 
The Supreme Court’s uprooting of patent eligibility laws by 
redrawing the boundaries of the judicial exceptions to statutory 
language has now had several years to settle, and the effects have 
been devastating. What biotechnology patent experts had predicted 
has come to pass, with many diagnostic method claims falling 
within the newly enlarged law of nature exception. Thus, in effect, 
entities engaged in the research necessary to discover a disease 
biomarker are now told their work is not even eligible for patent 
protection, a determination with huge business, investment and 
financial implications. Similarly, the expansion of the product of 
nature and abstract ideas exceptions have encapsulated a wide 
breadth of inventions, especially impacting methods used by 
biotechnology and software companies, for example those running 
medical diagnostic and bioinformatics technological applications to 
assess gene expression. 
This judicially created high threshold to what is patent eligible 
subject matter was created out of thin air and directly conflicts with 
the statutory language of Section 101 and its legislative intent.289 No 
better place can this uncertainty be seen than by looking at how the 
USPTO, the practicing patent bar, the district courts, and the Federal 
Circuit have interpreted and implemented the Supreme Court’s new 
test for determining patent eligibility. 
Patent office examiners were faced with no less than five sets of 
very detailed USPTO-promulgated guidelines in as many years. The 
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latest version of these guidelines reminded examiners that 
Section 101 is not the sole tool for determining patentability. The 
Supreme Court similarly has stated that “[t]he § 101 patent-
eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test”290 and that the lower 
courts should “tread carefully in construing this exclusionary 
principle lest it swallow all of patent law.”291 The Court also warned 
in Mayo that it “has recognized, however, that too broad an 
interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent 
law. For all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, 
or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”292 
Indeed, Section 101 was not written or intended to forego an 
analysis under different statutory sections of the Patent Act of 
whether, for example, major breakthrough medical diagnostics 
discoveries are new and non-obvious. 
Another problem with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 
this issue is that when coming up with their Mayo/Alice framework 
for determining the contours of their own created exceptions to the 
explicit statutory language of Section 101, neither of the Mayo nor 
Alice decisions addressed the legislative history of Section 101, nor 
the legislative text or history of the 1952 Patent Act.293 With Mayo, 
Myriad, and Alice, all being decided within three years in the past 
decade, it is clear that there is now wholescale expansion of the 
scope of the exclusions to patent eligible subject matter. Ironically, 
several years on, we are exactly where the Supreme Court warned 
we could be: a situation in which the judicial exceptions to 
Section 101 have all but “swallowed all of patent law,” and 
“eviscerated patent law,” as the Court itself warned in both Mayo 
and Alice.294 
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A. Exceptions to Patent Eligibility Laws Are Unnecessary 
Because Existing Statutory Patentability Requirements Prevent 
Patenting a Law of Nature or a Natural Phenomenon 
The Supreme Court decided eight cases in the last forty years 
concerning the patent eligibility issue, which is far more than on any 
other patent law doctrine, and it is noteworthy that four of those 
eight cases were decided recently back-to-back. However, even after 
these four recent decisions, the Supreme Court has been unable to 
provide a workable standard that comports with the legislative 
framework. If anything, as discussed supra, the current status of 
how the Supreme Court views patent eligibility law is directly 
inconsistent with statutory language and intent and has proved to be 
unworkable, causing havoc in industries focused on technological 
innovation such as the medical diagnostics industry. 
After the Mayo trilogy, the maw of subsequent patent eligibility 
rulings has greatly restricted the ability to patent certain 
technologies, including medical diagnostic technologies, and 
created inconsistency and uncertainty in the patent system. This is 
no less reflected by the fact that the Supreme Court has recently 
heard four patent eligibility cases in four years, and two 
moreVanda and Berkheimerare currently pending certiorari, 
with the Supreme Court inviting the Solicitor General’s view.295 
This has all contributed to a harder environment for obtaining a 
patent, especially since the threshold to assessing whether a subject 
matter is even patent eligible has been fundamentally raised. This 
uncertainty has even reached the point where the Supreme Court 
recently decided that a U.S. patent was merely a “public 
franchise,”296 which shocked observers because such a government 
franchise can technically later be withdrawn. 
While the judicial exceptions to Section 101 have had the effect 
of making it much harder to obtain a patent in certain technologies, 
and while these judicial exceptions are aligned with the policy of 
having a smaller number of high-quality patents as opposed to many 
weak patents, the method with which the Supreme Court has done 
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this, namely Section 101, has had unintended consequences for the 
biotechnology and software industries in the United States. For 
example, the highly regarded Cleveland Clinic and other major 
public and private research and development institutions are 
beginning to refrain from researching and developing certain types 
of innovative technologies directly because they cannot gain 
meaningful patent protection.297 Further, no patent protection means 
investors are unwilling to provide the capital necessary to develop 
innovative R&D to develop medical and software-driven 
technologies that can be deployed in hospitals and laboratories.298 
Thus, the Supreme Court was misguided to so fundamentally 
change patent eligibility laws. If the concern of the Court has been 
issues related to preemption as the Court indicated in Alice, and if 
the goal therefore has been to not allow patents for the judicially-
created exceptions, the Supreme Court should have refrained from 
so vastly expanding the scope of these exceptions in their three 
recent back-to-back cases. Instead, the focus should have remained 
on other statutes, namely Section 102 (requiring the invention to be 
new), Section 103 (requiring the invention to be nonobvious), and 
Section 112 (requiring a detailed description of the invention) to 
evaluate patent claims at issue.299 Indeed, this article advances the 
position that this strategy would simplify the subject matter 
eligibility analysis for the USPTO, courts, patent owners, 
practitioners and the public alike by prohibiting any determination 
of “inventiveness”300 and patentability issues under 
Sections 102, 103, and 112 from the Section 101 analysis. As is 
developed infra,301 there are possible fixes to the current untenable 
status quo. 
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Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has made this clear: “[t]he 
§ 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test . . . the 
claimed invention must also satisfy ‘the conditions and requirements 
of this title.’ Those requirements include that the invention be novel, 
see § 102, nonobvious, see § 103, and fully and particularly 
described, see § 112.”302 In Mayo, the U.S. government urged the 
Supreme Court not to depart far from the statutory language and to 
keep a low threshold for determining patent eligibility. They urged 
the Court to leave it to the parts of the Patent Act best suited to 
determine patentability, namely novelty under Section 102 and 
obviousness under Section 103.303 Indeed, others have also pointed 
out that provisions in the Patent Act should be used as the tool for 
invalidating claims, not Section 101.304 
Yet, in its Mayo decision, the Supreme Court disagreed with the 
U.S. government’s position, stating that it would make the “law of 
nature” exception to Section 101 a “dead letter” and is not consistent 
with Bilski, Diehr, Flook, and Benson.305 With the exception of 
Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court has hardly ever discussed the 
legislative history of Section 101,306 and instead has backed its more 
activist current jurisprudence on Section 101 under Mayo by merely 
referencing some of their own case law. The Court in Mayo refused 
“the Government’s invitation to substitute §§ 102, 103, and 112 
inquiries for the better-established inquiry under § 101,” and 
resisted calls by the government in Mayo to heavily reduce the 
influence of Section 101 and rely more on the traditional patent-
eligibility inquiry under Sections 102, 103, and 112. In the Court’s 
view, shifting the inquiry to the other provisions of the Patent Act 
“risks creating significantly greater legal uncertainty, while 
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assuming that those sections can do work that they are not equipped 
to do.”307 
However, many scholars, including the present author, disagree, 
instead believing that Section 101 is not the “better established 
inquiry.” As the Supreme Court itself has stated in Bilski, “[t]he 
§ 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test.”308 Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the court in Diehr, even explained that 
considering novelty under Section 101 was wholly inappropriate.309 
Seven years after the radical Mayo decision, the results are now self-
evident and point to uncertainty in this area of patent law. There is 
no question that this stifles technological innovation and the 
development of new technology and commercialization, especially 
in the medical diagnostics industry in the United States.310 Sadly, the 
Mayo decision has resulted in considerations of novelty, non-
obviousness and the description of an invention, all being made 
under the Section 101 patent eligibility umbrella. The result has 
greatly elevated the importance of Section 101, while diminishing 
the other traditionally more stringent statutory requirements of the 
Patent Act. This is made even more problematic by the fact that 
while the other key provisions of the Patent Act, for example novelty 
and obviousness, take into consideration the ordinary level of skill 
in the art in an effort to have an objective test, the new patent 
eligibility test is very subjective and does not require the 
involvement of the ordinary skilled artisan. Practically, this can 
result in judges and examiners who have less than ordinary skill in 
a particular technology, for example a medical diagnostic for liver 
cancer, making subjective determinations of what the “inventive 
concept” is, what amounts to “significantly more,” and what 
qualifies as “conventional and routine activity” in that given field of 
art. 
Another problem of the current Mayo/Alice patent eligibility test 
is that newly emerging breakthrough technologies, especially those 
in the medical diagnostic field, fail at this preliminary threshold step 
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and therefore are never commercialized or brought to market. This 
is because the Supreme Court, contrary to the statute, made the 
threshold of what is patent eligible subject matter so high. The test 
fails to make substantive determinations of the technology in view 
of a single prior art reference or what others have done to render any 
such breakthrough obvious. Also, the current Mayo/Alice patent 
eligibility framework does not factor in claim construction to any 
great level. This is even though such claim construction, including 
using intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, is a key feature of a 
patentability analysis. 
If the Supreme Court is adamant about maintaining its judicial 
exceptions to Section 101, a potential way forward would be for the 
Supreme Court to go back to the law of patent eligibility that existed 
before it unilaterally expanded the scope of patent ineligible subject 
matter in its Mayo/Myriad/Alice trilogy of cases. Indeed, by 
disrupting a quietly settled area of law through their 21st century 
Section 101 jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has magnified the 
focus on Section 101 and exposed the strident inconsistencies on 
how even the Court itself views patent eligible subject matter.311 So 
much so, that the Federal Circuit in their first decision involving 
biotechnology and medical diagnostics after the Supreme Court’s 
Mayo decision, ruled that an improved method of cryopreserving 
hepatocytes obtained from liver surgery or organ donors is patent 
eligible subject matter.312 In so doing, interestingly, the Federal 
Circuit chose to largely ignore the Supreme Court’s Mayo, Myriad 
and Alice line of cases and instead follow the Supreme Court’s 
Chakrabarty and Diehr decisions. 
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The uncertainty on what the patent eligibility test is and how to 
apply it has sadly resulted in the invalidation of some breakthrough 
inventive technologies,313 reflected, for example, by how the Federal 
Circuit recently viewed the breakaway medical diagnostic 
innovation in Ariosa.314 For example, in that case discovering unique 
fetal DNA in the blood of a pregnant mother and inventing a new 
method for non-invasively determining important fetal 
characteristics, as discussed below, should not fail the patent 
eligibility test under Section 101, as it has recently.315 Such a 
medical diagnostic test may not be patentable if routine methods 
were used to develop it, but the mere discovery itself ought to pass 
the Section 101 threshold inquiry. The patentability requirements of 
novelty and non-obviousness as listed in the other statutes of the 
Patent Act, for example, ought to be what determines whether such 
a discovery should obtain a U.S. patent or not. That is, patent 
eligibility and patentability are not the same concept. 
Judge Linn stated in a concurring opinion in Ariosa that prior to 
the invention, prenatal diagnosis involved invasive techniques that 
could potentially harm the fetus and increase the chance of a 
miscarriage. In his view, “[b]ut for the sweeping language in the 
Supreme Court’s Mayo opinion,” he saw “no reason, in policy or 
statute . . . why this breakthrough invention should be deemed patent 
ineligible.”316 After Ariosa was decided the same invention was 
found in November 2017 to be patent eligible subject matter by the 
highest court of the United Kingdom and, as recently as in August 
2019, that same invention was also found to be patent eligible by the 
highest court of Australia. With the U.S. Supreme Court refusing to 
grant certiorari in Ariosa, this technology, and many other medical 
diagnostics technologies like it, remain patent ineligible subject 
matter under current law in the U.S. 
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As it stands, the four recent Supreme Court decisions—Bilski, 
Mayo, Myriad, and Alice—have dramatically narrowed the scope of 
patent protection for innovation-dependent industries, such as 
medical diagnostics, by significantly expanding the judicially 
created exceptions to subject matter that is listed as patent eligible 
in the statute. Thus, there is growing discord among patent 
stakeholders, precipitated by the lack of clarity regarding the scope 
of subject matter that is eligible for a patent under Section 101. For 
example, David Kappos, the former Director of the USPTO, called 
for Congress to repeal the entire Section 101 statute from the Patent 
Act on the basis that it is unworkable. Additionally, the current 
acting Director of the USPTO, as recently as in 2019 and after 
releasing a dizzying fifth set of guidelines to patent examiners in as 
many years,317 indicated that the landscape of patent eligible subject 
matter remains troubling. Several senior judges have also voiced 
their concern with current jurisprudence on Section 101, as 
discussed above.318 Some propose amending the statute so as to not 
be out of line with the Supreme Court’s promulgated exceptions to 
the statute.319 
The time is ripe for Congress to revisit the Section 101 statute of 
the Patent Act. This article proposes a middle ground that does not 
repeal the statute that has largely remained unchanged for over 200 
years, but equally, does not propose amendments to the statute in 
order to keep the Supreme Court’s parallel jurisprudence in place. 
Instead, it advocates for a return to the statutory language and intent 
and suggests an option for Congress to do away with the three 
exceptions that the Supreme Court has unilaterally foisted upon 
Section 101. This position is very similar to the one taken by Judge 
Newman of the Federal Circuit in Alice.320 In some ways it is also 
similar to the position of the Intellectual Property Owners 
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Association (“IPO”) which encourages an amendment to the statute, 
stating that the “proposed legislation will: (a) reverse the Supreme 
Court ruling and restore the scope of subject matter eligibility to 
that intended by Congress; (b) define subject matter eligibility more 
clearly and in a technology-neutral manner; . . . and (d) simplify the 
subject matter eligibility analysis.”321 
Although the Supreme Court has previously overruled its own 
interpretation of patent eligibility,322 it appears the Court is unwilling 
to overrule or at least revise its recent incoherent decisions, most 
notably in Mayo, evidenced by the fact that the Court denied 
certiorari in Ariosa, an opportune moment for the Court to correct 
itself.323 In this latter example, over twenty amicus briefs from a 
variety of interested parties and industries were filed and yet the 
Supreme Court did not even ask for the Solicitor General’s view. 
Jurisprudence on patent-eligible subject matter, governed by 
Section 101, has currently entered a “maw” and the situation will 
only get worse as new technologies advance because these new 
advances will challenge courts’ interpretations of certain aspects of 
patent law.324 There is no question that current law governing patent-
eligibility under Section 101 is uncertain and in upheaval, and as 
many stakeholders argue, there is a need for action from Congress.325 
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B. Need for Harmonization: U.S. Laws on Patent Eligibility at 
Odds with Other Industrialized Nations’ Laws 
There are no statutes in the U.S. that have defined the kind of 
inventions or discoveries that would fall outside the ambit of 
patentable subject matter.326 Indeed, the only category of invention 
explicitly excluded by statute as patent ineligible subject matter is 
the more recent recitation of nuclear weapons as a category for 
which it is impermissible to obtain a patent.327 This contrasts 
European law where patent legislation explicitly lists the exceptions 
to patentable subject matter.328 Thus, unlike in Europe where there 
is clear explicit legislation, in the United States it is left to the courts 
to outline what kind of subject matter can and cannot be eligible for 
a patent. 
To highlight that the time is ripe for the U.S. Congress to act to 
reign in the caustic harm that the judicially created exceptions to 
Section 101 are causing to U.S. businesses and position on the 
global innovation economy, one can review how other industrialized 
countries’ patent laws address the same legal question. To make this 
point, I focus on one recent example of a new medical diagnostic 
method and discuss its treatment by patent laws of three 
industrialized nations, namely the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Australia. 
In this example, the technology concerned whether the 
discovery that there are fragments of fetal DNA in the blood a 
pregnant woman and that this can be used to provide a non-invasive 
way to determine fetal characteristics was patent eligible subject 
matter or not. The test itself has applications of great value, namely 
 
 326 Even though the language of Section 101 has largely remained the same for 
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it is an improved technique that does not require taking fetal or 
placental samples for screening for chromosomal abnormalities that 
could affect a baby’s health and development, such as trisomy 21 
(Down syndrome), sex chromosome aneuploidies, determining the 
gender of a baby and the like. Since the commercial potential for the 
prenatal diagnostic market is enormous, patent litigation ensued 
between the innovator and copycats for this same technology in 
several international jurisdictions, including in the United States, 
United Kingdom, and Australia. 
The U.S. position has been that this diagnostic method is patent 
ineligible subject matter under Section 101 because the presence of 
the cell free fragments of fetal DNA in maternal blood was a natural 
phenomenon and the claims did not contain an inventive concept 
sufficient to “transform” the natural phenomenon into a patent 
eligible subject matter.329 Thus, the invention is patent ineligible 
because it falls under the judicially created exception to patent 
eligible subject matter for being “naturally-occurring.”330 
Yet, in direct contrast to the U.S. position, Australia’s High 
Court decided in August 2019 that this same discovery is patent 
eligible subject matter.331 Additionally, the High Court of Justice in 
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the United Kingdom, similar to Australia’s High Court, recently also 
heard this same legal issue, involving the same technology.332 There, 
in 2017, Justice Henry Carr of the U.K. High Court, similar to 
Justice Beach’s August 2019 decision from Australia’s High Court, 
found that such a patent claim is patent eligible subject matter.333 
The consistency between the U.K.’s highest court’s decision in 
November 2017 and Australia’s highest court’s decision in August 
2019 on this same legal issue involving the same technology, 
finding the technology to be patent eligible subject matter in both 
U.K. and A.U., greatly contrasts current U.S. law and puts the U.S. 
position directly at odds with positions taken on the same legal issue 
by other industrialized nations with well-developed legal systems. 
Practically, this difference has had negative results for the U.S. 
leadership role in innovation, especially so in the biotechnology and 
medical diagnostics field as evidenced by a recent study.334 Further, 
as Judge Randall Rader, recently retired former Chief Judge at the 
CAFC noted recently, “[f]rankly, there is no country in the world 
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that does what we do here. We have once again, set ourselves on a 
course which is out of harmony with the rest of the world’s 
intellectual property standards.”335 
C. Legislative Options and Ripe Time for Congress to Act 
The impact of the new patent eligibility legal regime the 
Supreme Court has ordered has been very negative. Although patent 
defendants may rejoice, the consequences on U.S. private and public 
enterprises conducting biomedical research, including those aiming 
to commercialize new medical diagnostics, has been seismic. This 
radical change in law has deterred the commercialization of certain 
biomedical inventions because of the weakened patent protection for 
those technologies and a disruption of the business ecosystem in 
which they and their partners operate, including having a direct 
negative effect on capital investment into such projects, as discussed 
above.336 As a result, there have been recent proposals to legislate 
and change the laws governing patent eligible subject matter. 
As of the beginning of 2020, the U.S. Congress is considering 
making changes to patent eligibility laws. As an indication of 
forthcoming changes to the law, Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) 
recently said in at a conference that subject matter eligibility is “an 
area where the jurisprudence is insufficiently clear, and which may 
necessitate congressional action to provide clarity and 
consistency.”337 
As 2020 begins, since the Federal Circuit has been unable or 
unwilling to define the contours of what is and is not patent eligible 
subject matter in view of the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence 
on the issue, a group of Senators and House of Representatives are 
presently considering fixing the Supreme Court-created patent 
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eligibility problem338 and they have released a bipartisan framework 
for Section 101 reform in which they outline specific goals.339 The 
lawmakers seek to come up with legislative language, with the 
anticipation being that bills will be introduced in 2020 in both the 
House and the Senate. Many major patent stakeholders are also 
encouraging Congress to act; for example, both the Intellectual 
Property Owners Association and the American Intellectual 
Property Law Association, both well-regarded professional IP 
associations, have written to Congress asking the lawmakers to undo 
the Mayo/Alice framework through legislation.340 This is an 
opportune time for Congress to do so because the time is ripe and it 
is necessary. The time may be ripe, but what should Congress do 
regarding patent eligibility? 
Professors Lefstin and Menell have proffered a legislative 
proposal of focusing on a “practical application” of an abstract idea, 
natural law, or natural phenomenon.341 The proposal would be to 
align with pre-Mayo jurisprudence. This position also has some 
backing from the ABA’s Section of Intellectual Property Law, 
evidenced by their submission of comments to the USPTO that 
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largely agree with this “practical application” test.342 Moreover, 
Professors Lefstin and Menell, well-known patent law scholars, 
submitted a supplementary statement, as recent as in Summer of 
2019, to the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on 
Intellectual Property Hearings on “The State of Patent Eligibility in 
America.”343 
Yet, as reasonable and elegant as this “practical application” test 
is to other IP scholars, including the present author who is a fan of 
the proposal, from a pure practical standpoint, it may be hard to 
effectively and universally implement. This would likely be 
exasperated by the fact that patent examiners look for a test to easily 
apply when examining patent applications in the trenches with little 
time and many Office Actions to write. Indeed, to have some 10,000 
patent examiners of all education and work backgrounds and over 
200 Administrative Patent Judges at the USPTO, all trained to 
effectively and uniformly examine patent eligibility issues based on 
what would remain a convoluted subjective legal framework may be 
asking too much. The reality is that it is likely overly ambitious to 
expect patent examiners to perform this examination process 
consistently, in a technology-neutral, objective manner. 
In contrast, a recent article took an empirical approach and found 
that the two-step test for patent eligibility may not be as impossible 
to administer as many have suggested and in fact the test may be 
clearer for certain types of claims than for others.344 However, it is 
noteworthy that this study used a survey of 231 patent attorneys, 
which may not be reflective of the over 10,000 patent examiners, the 
majority of which do not have a formal legal background.345 Thus, 
how clear the test is and how easy it is to apply remains up for 
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debate, with majority of stakeholders finding it more cumbersome 
and unpredictable than not. 
It may be noteworthy here to state that there are a minority group 
of scholars who argue to the contrary on this issue. For example, 
Professor Landers’ recent article studying the interconnections 
between entrepreneurship, science and patents proposes a more 
nuanced view than the linear model of innovation that directly links 
patent law’s importance to basic science and innovation, and that the 
recent restrictive nature of the patent eligibility laws has the 
potential to maximize available information for entrepreneurship 
and thereby promote innovation and not stifle it as the majority of 
scholars have argued.346 However, most scholars recognize the need 
for action, describing the current test in a variety of ways, including 
it being “too philosophical and policy based to be administrable”347 
and “a foggy standard cloaked as a rule.”348 
There is a clear chorus amongst the patent bar, drumming for 
change to the current patent eligibility laws. Other proposals, 
including one from former USPTO Director Kappos, have included 
the wholesale repealing of the entire Section 101 statute from the 
Patent Act on the basis that it is unworkable and is outdated since it 
has virtually remained unchanged since the 18th century. And 
although the Intellectual Property Owners Association’s position 
may have evolved, they proposed amending the statute and that the  
proposed legislative language would address patent-eligibility concerns 
by reversing the Supreme Court decisions and restoring the scope of 
subject matter eligibility to that intended by Congress . . . ; defining the 
scope of subject matter eligibility more clearly and in a technology-
neutral manner; and simplifying the . . . eligibility analysis.349 
This article respectfully presents yet another option, and one I 
rank highly on available options, and that is to encourage the 
lawmakers to look at Europe or even Japan, both equally 
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industrialized nations with developed legal frameworks, and analyze 
their patent laws as a model framework on this patent eligibility 
issue. 
At the outset, the European Patent Office (“EPO”), much like 
the USPTO, considers that the discovery of a natural phenomenon 
not to be patent eligible. However, unlike U.S. law, the EPO takes 
the view that a patentable invention can derive from a practical use 
of that discovery,350 such as its use in a method of diagnosis. As an 
example, discovering a naturally occurring correlation between a 
biomarker for cancer X can focus on the use of that discovery in a 
new method to diagnose cancer X. Thus, in Europe, method claims 
directed at diagnosing a disease by first detecting the presence or 
levels of a biomarker in a patient are patentable, even if the 
correlation itself is naturally occurring and not patentable. 
Moreover, under their framework, the EPO determines 
patentability based on two factors: a patent eligibility hurdle351 (akin 
to our Section 101) which requires the claimed subject matter to 
have a technical character; and a patentability hurdle352 (akin to our 
sections 102 and 103), which requires the claimed subject matter to 
contribute a technical solution to a technical problem. Moreover, 
instead of undergoing a Mayo trilogy analysis as discussed above, 
any application claiming an invention that falls into a category 
prohibited by the European Patent Convention is expressly rejected 
by the EPO.353 In drawing parallels, any legislative fixes to current 
U.S. patent eligibility laws, could model itself to be a “threshold,” 
like Article 52 of the European Patent Convention, and thereby list 
subject matter that doesn’t possess technical character, such as 
mathematical methods, methods for performing mental acts or doing 
business, and presentations of information. 
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This may be an easier approach to implement in practice, 
especially by the very large number of patent examiners at the 
USPTO. Indeed, it appears that as 2020 begins, a bipartisan 
framework for Section 101 reform is under consideration by a 
number of Senators and House Representatives, and one of their 
goals is indeed to name a short exclusive list of categories, much 
like in Europe. Under consideration are to list and thereby explicitly 
exclude mental activities, pure mathematical formulas, products that 
exist solely and exclusively in nature, fundamental scientific 
principles and economic principles.354 
Instead of focusing on the idea of abolishing in toto the Supreme 
Court created exceptions to the statute, other options include 
amending the Section 101 statute itself in order to focus on the word 
“useful” by deleting the word “new”. The aim here would be to 
clearly highlight that Section 101 is separate from and different to 
the “new” requirement of Section 102, thereby obviating the most 
common criticism of the Mayo test. This would avoid having to 
determine what is routine conventional activity and what would be 
“significantly more” and “inventive” (or how new the claimed 
invention is), thereby setting aside the highly disruptive Supreme 
Court’s recent Mayo decision and restoring the Supreme Court’s 
older Diehr legal framework. 
Indeed, other options would be to go a step further and codify 
Diehr and expressly state that in order to determine patent eligibility 
under Section 101, novelty under Section 102 and obviousness 
under Section 103, must not be considered, and thus also 
highlighting that subjectively determining what is and is not routine 
and conventional activity has no place in a Section 101 patent 
eligible subject matter analysis. Finally, to harmonize Section 101 
with other parts of the Patent Act, namely the Section 102 novelty 
section, the Section 103 obviousness section, and the Section 112 
definiteness section, Section 101 could be amended to include 
parallel language that focuses on the person having ordinary skill in 
the art, much like all the other sections of the Patent Act. This would 
help to remove the presently subjective patent eligibility question 
out of the hands of patent examiners at the USPTO and judges in the 
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courts and make it more an objective analysis in parallel fashion to 
other sections of the Patent Act. 
It remains up for discussion what the final bills will say and how 
lawmakers will attempt to remedy the current status of affairs. One 
thing remains obvious: Section 101 cannot remain as is because 
America’s leadership position on innovation and entrepreneurial 
new technology development and commercialization is at stake. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Patent Act defines four independent categories of subject 
matter that are eligible for patent protection, namely processes, 
machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter.355 The express 
statutory language and its legislative history make it clear that 
Congress intended to give a wide scope to patent eligible subject 
matter. Yet, from these four broad categories that are listed in the 
statute, the Supreme Court has judicially created three exceptions 
and the Court recently vastly expanded the scope of these 
exceptions. 
This article advances the proposition that the biotechnology 
industry and in particular entities developing the medical diagnostic 
technologies of the future would stand to benefit from abolishing the 
non-statutory, Supreme Court-promulgated, exceptions to Section 
101 altogether, or at least by making certain clear amendments to 
the statute, so as to bring certainty to this fundamental basic question 
of the patent ecosystem: what subject matter is eligible for a patent. 
These Supreme Court-created exceptions to the statutory language 
have no constitutional or legislative foundation and have caused 
great uncertainty in patent laws, harming the biotechnology, 
personalized medicine and medical diagnostics industries. The 
Supreme Court’s decisions on patent eligibility of the past decade 
have damaged America’s standing as a leader in new technology 
development and commercialization. The time is ripe for Congress 
to act to correct the patent eligibility legal landscape and thereby 
promote technological innovation, especially in the medical 
diagnostics field. 
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